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The Department of State bulletin

VOL. XXIX, No. 743 • PUBLICATION 5192

September 21, 1953

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, as well as legislative material in the field of international relations, are listed currently.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:
52 issues, domestic \$7.50, foreign \$10.25
Single copy, 20 cents

The printing of this publication has
been approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 22, 1952).

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A Realistic Review of Foreign Policy Problems

by Under Secretary Smith¹

Your organization, its record, and its achievements are a source of pride to all of your fellow Americans and particularly to those who have served with you under arms.

The stands you have taken on foreign policy issues—the issues with which I am now primarily concerned—have been clear cut, and in my opinion they have been sound and realistic.

Nowadays it isn't always easy to be realistic about foreign affairs. You have stood for a strong America willing and able to meet its world responsibilities. In backing the mutual security program, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the United Nations, you have recognized that America cannot stand alone in this uncertain world.

You have shown a clear understanding of the fact that the solutions to foreign policy problems do not come easily or quickly.

This administration, and particularly those of us who have to deal in foreign policy, appreciate that understanding. We are grateful for it. While we need and must have criticism, we also need understanding and confidence.

We have to know what the American people think.

In a democracy no government agency can possibly function effectively if it cannot hear the voice of the people. No policy, foreign or domestic, makes sense if the American people do not display an interest in it. And certainly no line of foreign policy can succeed unless our people are informed of it, have a clear understanding of it, and out of their own knowledge and free will support it.

Foreign policy problems are rarely susceptible of simple solutions. During the past months I have often recalled the statement made by a lecturer when I was a student at the War College. He said: "The only thing more difficult than waging war with the help of allies is waging war without them." This applies with greater force to the

problems of waging peace. We have no right to expect that our allies should react to any given situation in exactly the same way that we react. Their economic and political pressures are different. It is the difficult responsibility of the Secretary of State to bring these many different points of view into focus with our own, making such compromises as can be made without sacrificing any of the basic principles to which the American people and their government are committed. In that way the people of the free world can advance together toward our objectives of peace and stability. Frequently the accomplishments—I should say the victories—the Secretary of State attains cannot be advertised until long after the event. But already these successes have been significant.

You must remember, however, that though we Americans live by moral laws that are deeply imbedded in our traditions and our way of life, we are dealing with an international bloc which has not demonstrated that it is willing to accept a moral law. The Soviet Union and its satellite nations base their policies on power as the central and immediate factor of international life, and they have yet to demonstrate that they are genuinely interested in peace.

Five months ago President Eisenhower frankly asked the Soviet leaders to work with us for a decent peace and for a better life for all peoples.²

The President said:

Recent statements and gestures of Soviet leaders give some evidence that they may recognize this critical moment. We welcome every honest act of peace. . . . We care only for sincerity of peaceful purpose attested by deeds.

We are still waiting for those deeds. And we continue to hope that the Soviet Union will take the many available opportunities to act as well as to speak for peace. But until such time as the Soviet Union makes it clear that it wants to work for peace, we have no alternative but to continue to think in terms of the existing power situation.

¹ Address made before the Jewish War Veterans' 68th annual convention at Chicago on Sept. 5 (press release 481).

² BULLETIN of Apr. 27, 1953, p. 599.

We must continue to defend the principles we live by and our Nation's security by building the material strength with which to keep the Communist menace under control. We must continue to work with like-minded nations in enforcement of the moral law which the Communists have yet to accept.

A classic historian once said: "Lust for power is the most flagrant of all the passions."

The Soviet Union has shown us just how dangerous that passion can be.

What, then, does the existing power situation require of us? It is reasonable to conclude that it demands three things of us:

We must understand the nature of Soviet power—its strengths as well as its weaknesses.

We must maintain the unity and strength of the existing free world alliance and the responsibility of our leadership of that alliance.

We must understand the nature of our own strength and how to increase it.

The material power of the Soviet bloc is great and will become greater. But it is not without its weaknesses, actual and potential. One such weakness lies in the Soviet dictatorship's very structure.

I believe that a dictatorship, whether it is Communist or Fascist, ultimately demands one-man control. It cannot operate indefinitely under committee control. I do not believe that any single man in the Soviet Union today has achieved the power of control that Stalin had. Malenkov is Prime Minister, but he is a long way from Stalin's position in Soviet affairs.

Struggle for Power in U.S.S.R.

This situation implies a struggle for power. The fall of Lavrenti Beria, former chief of the secret police and widely hailed as the Soviet Union's "number two" man only 2 months ago, suggests that this struggle for power began even before Stalin's death.

I believe that this struggle will continue. As long as it does, it represents a source of weakness. But it also presents the dangerous possibility of precipitate action by insecure leadership.

Unquestionably, Stalin served as a solidifying influence in Soviet affairs, but it took a war and a generation of propaganda to make him the power that he was. It will not be easy to create a figure massive enough to wear Stalin's mantle. And the job can hardly begin until the internal struggle for power is decided in the Soviet Union.

Another source of Soviet weakness lies in the mass dissatisfaction so widespread in the European satellites. There is evidence of this in such developments as the recent riots in Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia.

The Iron Curtain seems to be getting a little

less iron in spots. Escapees are pouring through it despite all the precautions and tyrannical measures the Communists take to prevent it.

There are other signs of weakness as well. But I must tell you none of them justify any estimate that Kremlin control is likely to disintegrate.

The Soviet Union controls more than one-third of the world's peoples and many of the earth's most precious resources. Its internal security and police system is ruthless and efficient.

Subject peoples under constant police surveillance can do little to oppose a political system which has a monopoly of weapons, hermetically sealed control of the press and radio, and complete indifference to the ideals of human liberty and the dignity of the individual.

The Soviet Union possesses tremendous military strength and the capacity to use it. It has the largest modern army in the world. It has the atomic bomb, and it has the means of delivering that bomb. Its rulers have repeatedly announced their implacable hostility to our way of life and to our ideals.

Confronted by this hostility, and in the absence of any real evidence toward peaceful coexistence, there is no alternative except to maintain our own strength and the strength and unity of the free world. America must be strong, and we can be strong enough only if we have allies, willing and able, to cooperate with us in a common defense of freedom. In this cooperation we do not have to abandon the traditions of our own country, nor do we ask our friends to abandon theirs.

The lesson of Korea, costly though it has been to us, is that the free world's power lies primarily in *united* action and that this power and unity is *not yet* sufficiently developed to insure the security of the free world.

We ourselves require strong military defenses, sound production targets for military equipment, and an adequate reservoir of trained manpower.

We need to retain confidence in ourselves and to inspire confidence in others who look to us for leadership. As Secretary Dulles said recently, our vision is of more than mere survival in the face of danger—it is to end the menace under which humanity has existed for so long.

Modernizing the U.N. Charter

He expressed his belief, in which I certainly concur, that the United Nations Charter still represents the world's best hope of peace with justice. But the United Nations, in its present form, has not met all our expectations, and he announced that the United States will vote in 1955 in favor of holding a general conference to review the present Charter in the light of the experience since 1945.³ We believe that this task of modernizing

³ *Ibid.*, Sept. 7, 1953, p. 311.

the Charter should command the serious attention of all individuals and groups, in and out of America, interested in promoting peace. Every segment of responsible American opinion has recognized the need for the U.N. organization and for our active and constructive participation in it.

If we are to exercise our full role in the Eighth General Assembly convening 10 days from now, it is particularly essential that we practice at home what we preach abroad. We must maintain our own precious liberties. We must not depart from the principles upon which this Nation was founded.

Your organization has, I know, shown its awareness of the very direct relationship between a sound defense and a sound adherence to the liberties which have made our country what it is.

Time and again you have taken a forthright stand against all forms of bigotry and against all attempts to destroy individual liberty. And you have done so as Americans—not as spokesmen for any special group. You are to be highly commended for that.

I have said a great deal about power in one form or another. It is worthwhile recalling the statement of the Roman historian: "He who has great power should use it lightly." In modern terms that means: "Let's be diplomatic when we flex our muscles."

In a world in which the United States faces pressing foreign policy problems on many fronts, this maxim is particularly appropriate.

Problems Facing the Near East

In no area is it more appropriate, from our point of view, than in the Near East. In no area is tact, patience, and understanding more important.

The Near East today is torn by many tensions. The peoples there face many difficult problems. We Americans have worked with them and hope to continue to work with them in solving these problems, for our security is involved as well as theirs.

The Near East is the strategic crossroads for three continents. It is the historic route of conquerors and would-be conquerors. Its proved oil reserves today contain about 50 percent of the world's total. Most important of all, its more than 40 million people represent great and ancient cultures. These people represent a real reservoir of strength for the free world.

Yet, today, the vital Near East could not defend itself if any large-scale aggression were to be launched against it. This is true despite the fact that the armed forces of a revitalized Greece and Turkey exist as a partial buffer for the area.

The reality of the situation is that a sound regional defense system for the Near East is not just around the corner. There are too many problems that must be ironed out first. This does not mean,

of course, that America will stand idly by without helping those Near Eastern countries who want help in developing their own defenses. The Congress has appropriated funds for military aid to the Near East. We intend to use those funds in keeping with the expressed will of Congress.

As any Near Eastern nation makes it clear that it wants our aid and is ready to develop its defenses, we will do what we can to help. But we will make aid available only for purposes of self-defense. We have no intention of imposing our will on any nation in the Near East or anywhere else. We have no blueprint which we expect any other country to adopt.

On the other hand, we certainly do not expect to help any country if that aid is to be used for aggressive purposes. We seek to foster cooperation—not strife.

Victory in Korea

In the Far East our most immediate concern at this time is, of course, Korea. The armistice which was signed after 3 long years of conflict ended the bloodshed on one flank of the Asian theater. And when we stopped the Communist aggression in Korea the free world won a *victory*. I cannot share the point of view of those who see it as less than that.

We did in Korea what we went there to do. We halted the aggressor, who now holds less territory than he had when he launched his attack. We kept an independent nation from being engulfed. We demonstrated that aggression does not pay. And even though we and our South Korean allies carried the heavy load, there was demonstrated with success the principle of collective action by free nations.

Most important of all, we have contributed to our own national security. When you get right down to it, we and our allies fought in Korea so we would not have to fight in our own backyards.

The question is frequently asked: What happens if the Communists violate the armistice in Korea? The answer is that there are many safeguards in the armistice. In addition, the United States and the other 15 members of the United Nations which fought in Korea have signed an agreement⁴ which should give the Communists every reason to avoid a violation.

Under this agreement the 16 nations "would again be united and prompt to resist" should the armistice be breached by unprovoked Communist aggression. They have also made it clear that in this event hostilities will not necessarily again be confined within Korea.

We consider this agreement a sound deterrent to further Communist aggression in Korea.

Within the next month or so, those nations most

⁴ *Ibid.*, Aug. 24, 1953, p. 247.

directly concerned with the situation in Korea will, we hope, sit down at a political conference. The conference is designed to iron out the many critical problems which follow in the wake of the armistice.

I suggest that we as Americans observe this conference with patience and with a sense of realism. Last week, when Ambassador Lodge presented in the United Nations the position of the United States with regard to the political conference, he spoke from a sound and reasonable position.⁵ We opposed a roundtable form of conference. It was our considered opinion that a roundtable conference would make it possible for the Communists to prolong negotiations indefinitely and to complicate the basic problem of a Korean settlement by the introduction of other questions and demands.

The United States is not opposed to a somewhat broader discussion of Asian problems if and when the Communists demonstrate their serious intentions toward the settlement of the specific problem of Korea. But we could not accept the possibility of having other and probably unacceptable conditions attached to this problem.

There was a good deal of apprehension expressed by journalists and commentators here and abroad because the United States was on the minority side of the vote, but I believe the outcome has demonstrated the value of a sound policy decision, firmly and reasonably maintained. We will have a conference organization capable of producing a settlement if the Communists really want one.

Out of this could develop an end to aggression in Asia—again, I say, if the Communists really want it.

The next test is Indochina, where our allies are still heavily engaged. As the President has said, a truce in Korea which permitted the continuation or intensification of aggression in Indochina or elsewhere in Southeast Asia would be a delusion and a fraud. We cannot be indifferent to this struggle. It has as direct a bearing on our own security as did Korea.

The NATO Status of Forces Treaty

There is another topic of foreign affairs I would like to talk about. It has a direct impact on domestic relationships. It is the NATO Status of Forces Treaty, about which there has been a great deal of misinformation and unnecessary apprehension.⁶

This treaty was approved by the Senate just before it adjourned, and only last month one of my favorite periodicals asked the editorial question, "Why Should Foreign Courts Try Our GI's?"

⁵ *Ibid.*, Sept. 14, 1953, p. 361.

⁶ For text of Under Secretary Smith's statement concerning this treaty before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, see *BULLETIN* of Apr. 27, 1953, p. 628.

As veterans you are entitled to the answer to a question which has been put in ways calculated to arouse grave misgivings. The simple fact is that under international law a sovereign nation has complete jurisdiction throughout its territories, and foreign troops are subject to its criminal jurisdiction unless exempted *by its consent*.

During the last war our troops in most areas had complete exemption from local jurisdiction. With the coming of peace, many nations refused to continue the wartime exemption. In some countries our troops have had no exemption whatever. In others, such as the United Kingdom, we were given notice that the exemption accorded by special statute would be terminated.

At the hearings which preceded the approval of the NATO Status of Forces Treaty by the Senate, the Attorney General of the United States advised that, in the absence of agreement, foreign troops are not exempt from criminal jurisdiction and that by this treaty our troops gained rights that they would not otherwise have.

It has been suggested that negotiations could have produced the continuation, as a consideration of our military and economic aid, of the complete extraterritoriality which our troops abroad enjoyed during the war.

The fact is that after more than 2 years of discussion none of the 14 NATO countries concerned was willing to surrender its sovereignty to this extent, as a similar concession would have been required of each in favor of all the others.

This treaty between the 14 NATO countries is unique in that it fixes the conditions under which bodies of troops may be stationed in foreign countries in peacetime for long periods. Under its terms these 14 nations agree, in effect, that foreign troops shall be exempt from local criminal jurisdiction for crimes committed while on duty.

These troops remain subject to local criminal jurisdiction *only* for crimes committed when off duty.

You will realize, I know, that in our own country it is not conceivable that Congress would deprive our local courts of jurisdiction over a crime committed by a foreign soldier on leave.

This treaty was negotiated in the period of 1950-52 at the instance of the military authorities. President Eisenhower urged ratification of the treaty, as did Generals Bradley, Ridgway, and Gruenther and Admirals Radford, McCormick, and Carney, all of whom have had vast experience with the problems involved and each of whom is well known for his deep personal interest in the welfare and protection of our soldiers. And the Department of State, though functioning only in the formal role of negotiator, was alert to see that every possible safeguard was inserted to insure the absolute maximum of justice and fair legal treatment for our men serving abroad.

Our military authorities are convinced, and we agree, that our GI's are adequately protected by

this treaty. Indeed, they have gained rights instead of losing them.

Were it not for such a multilateral agreement as this, it would be almost impossible for our NATO Commander, General Gruenther, to have any flexibility in the movement of the allied forces under his command. With it this flexibility of maneuver is provided, and another step has been taken on the road toward full cooperation among the free nations of Europe.

There has been continued and steady progress in this direction, even though it has been much slower than we had hoped for. A short time ago I had long talks with Jean Monnet, an old friend who is head of the Coal and Steel Community, brought into existence as the result of the Schuman plan. You are all familiar with this project, which placed the coal and steel producing countries of free Europe under an international authority.

But you may not have realized that this authority recently weathered its first critical test when one of the major producing countries, objecting to a decision which was against purely national interests, nevertheless accepted it in the interest of the community as a whole.⁷

If Europe can effect integration and cooperation in matters relating to coal and steel, it can do likewise in other economic matters and in political and security matters as well.

A Word About the State Department

Finally, because the people who represent you abroad and in the field of foreign policy are of direct interest and concern to you—your organization is well represented among them—I want to say a word about the State Department itself, in which I now am proud to serve.

On January 31 last the personnel of the State Department numbered 42,154. On August 31 it was 20,321. About 16,000 people were transferred with their programs to other agencies. The functions remaining in the State Department have been reduced by about 5,000.

Our present strength is a little less than we need for full operating efficiency, but only a little. In spite of these drastic changes and reductions, morale is high.

With regard to the effectiveness of the individuals, I can do no better than to quote an old "competitor." In his recent book *My Europe*, Sir

⁷ For an account of the decision of the Coal and Steel Community's High Authority in the question involving German sales taxes, see *ibid.*, June 8, 1953, p. 802.

Robert Bruce Lockhart, a veteran of 40 years of British diplomacy, has this to say:

For a long time I have felt uneasy about the manner in which we frequently deride American diplomacy and assume complacently that the long experience of our own diplomatists gives them a vast superiority over their American colleagues. The career American diplomats are a remarkable body of men, thoroughly trained for their job, eager, receptive, more alive to the social convulsions of a changing world and less conservative than their British colleagues. I think that ever since 1918 they have been more often right in regard to Europe than we have, and that man for man they are fully our equals.

I believe that Bruce Lockhart is correct in his estimate, and I can say this objectively, having spent my own life in the harsher school of another career service.

And I am glad to be able to say this to you.

In our world, where the oceans and skies have become highways rather than protections—when America must be concerned with the economic and political problems of free peoples everywhere—when mankind possesses the means for its own total destruction—our security depends as much on those who conduct our foreign policy as on those who man our military defenses.

Our State Department is the historic instrument for carrying out our foreign policies. On the success of those policies very probably depends the issue of war or peace.

Let us remember that with an abiding faith and sense of responsibility.

U.S.-Bulgarian Relations

*Statement by Lincoln White
Acting Chief, News Division¹*

The Department has noted with interest the recent statement of the Bulgarian Prime Minister regarding the present lack of diplomatic relations between his government and the United States. It would not serve any useful purpose to review at this time the actions which led to the suspension of relations in 1950.² The Department would like to take this opportunity, however, to reaffirm the sentiments of deep and abiding friendship which the American people and Government have toward the people of Bulgaria.

¹ Made to correspondents on Sept. 10.

² BULLETIN of Mar. 6, 1950, p. 351.

Force and Consent in International Affairs

by Louis J. Halle, Jr.

"If to do," said Portia, "were as easy as to know what were good to do, chapels had been churches, and poor men's cottages princes' palaces."

In the development of any nation's foreign policy, the difficulty is less in choosing ends than in finding means. The problem of choosing ends, in fact, arises largely out of the limitation of available means. If you have the means only for a poor man's cottage, you may as well save yourself the trouble of planning a prince's palace. Similarly, it would be useless and perhaps dangerous for us as a Nation to decide, say, that we will forthwith establish American freedoms and democratic practices throughout the world, if means adequate to these ends are not available.

The management of a nation's foreign affairs is, in this sense, less a matter of good intentions than of good economy. This is a reality that we Americans face reluctantly, for we have been brought up on a relative abundance of means and have the habit of wealth. Throughout most of our history our limited external objectives have been well within our continental resources. Consequently, in international affairs we take to utopianism more readily than to concepts of economy.

The limitation of means, it should be noted, embraces all the elements of a nation's external power and influence, moral as well as material. In the economy of foreign affairs, wasting one's diplomatic strength may be as serious as wasting one's stock of manganese or of foreign exchange. Only in the most partial sense, therefore, is it possible to deal with this kind of economy in arithmetical terms.

The thoughts set down here, on the principles of economy in foreign affairs, are more suggestive than conclusive. They represent only an approach to problems and dilemmas that challenge our national ability to survive.

One may begin with a perfectly obvious statement: In the field of foreign affairs, as distinct from domestic affairs, a government deals with matters outside its jurisdiction.

Here at home, in the domestic arena, our Government governs. That is, it makes the rules and

it enforces them. But our Government has no authority to arrest Communists in France; it has no right of eminent domain in Brazil; it cannot set customs duties in South Africa; and it does not cast India's vote in the United Nations. It must deal with foreign affairs, therefore, in terms that are less direct and decisive than those in which it deals with domestic affairs. This limitation is almost intolerably frustrating to dictatorial governments, but even a government of limited powers, such as ours, suffers its own degree of frustration.

Now, in dealing with matters beyond their jurisdiction, governments can achieve their objectives only by controlling or influencing those who do have jurisdiction. Broadly speaking, they can do this in either of two ways. They can follow policies calculated to gain the willing consent of those who have jurisdiction, or they can follow policies involving the use of force to compel their acquiescence.

It is true that there is no sharp dividing line between these two approaches, just as there is no sharp dividing line between willing consent and reluctant acquiescence. In one case a government may find that, without exerting any pressure, it has the spontaneous and eager consent of another country to what it wants to do. If we should decide that we wanted to develop the St. Lawrence Seaway, for example, we would find Canada more than willing to allow it and to cooperate in it. In another case, a government may gain the consent of another country only by granting reciprocal favors; we might tell the Swiss, for instance, that if they buy more American automobiles we will buy more Swiss cheese. In still another case a government may gain the acquiescence of the other country by threatening to take actions injurious to it. Finally, it may force acquiescence by dropping bombs.

The fact that black and white may be separated by a transitional zone of gray, which is neither, does not mean that black is indistinguishable from white. Recognizing that there is a gray zone between voluntary consent at one extreme and compelled acquiescence at the other, we may still find it useful to think in terms of a choice that govern-

ments may make, in their foreign affairs, between policies calculated to gain the willing consent of others and policies involving the use of force to compel their acquiescence.

Active and Passive Uses of Force

The relationship between force and consent, between those two general approaches to the problem of attaining national objectives, is a reciprocating relationship of considerable delicacy and complexity. When a government uses force in international relations, it is bound, one way or another, to affect the disposition of others to accord their consent. Where the use of force is resented, potential consent is diminished by so much. Where it arouses respect, the potential of consent may be increased. It is human to admire the strong when they display their strength; it is also human to resent them. Which reaction you get, and in what degree or in what mixture, depends on the circumstances.

The active use of force, however, is generally a pretty drastic matter. It administers a shock to international relations which may entail considerable and perhaps unforeseen changes in the potential of consent enjoyed by the nation that uses it. A nation should never deliberately use active force, then, in pursuing its foreign objectives without most careful consideration, in advance, of the effects on the opinion of people whose consent is important to it. Since force is most effective when the mere fact of commanding it prompts others to respect one's views, its active employment should always be regarded, in any case, as the indication of a failure.

This is a matter that must concern military planners no less than civilians. For the loss of consent, in most cases, leads to an increase in the requirements for force. Thus, the military solution to a problem may dispose of *that* problem, but it may at the same time create greater problems calling for additional military solutions. This can lead into a vicious spiral in which loss of consent results in new requirements for the use of force, and the use of force leads to additional loss of consent—until the country that has embarked on this course finds its requirements exceeding its resources.

All history provides examples of how this interrelationship of force and consent works. Here are two:

For many years Great Britain exercised an absolute rule over certain Negro populations in central Africa. In his published lecture on "The Meaning of Prestige," Harold Nicolson refers to this rule as being exercised through "a mere handful of Englishmen—rare specks of foam upon a wide dark sea." Plainly, the handful of Englishmen depended on the acquiescence, at least, of the native population. But one may suppose that,

in fact, they depended on more than mere acquiescence. The subject population was primitive; it stood in awe of the white man, who must have seemed like a sort of demigod, to be feared—as the early Israelites feared Jehovah—but also to be zealously served and honored. This quality and degree of genuine consent (based on what Nicolson calls "prestige") was what enabled the handful of Englishmen to exercise authority from day to day, for they did not hold in their hands instruments adequate to enforce obedience. Nevertheless, this consent did reflect awe of the power that was regarded as inhering in the British crown, of which the Englishmen were the representatives and agents, and force was an essential element in that power. Consequently, the British Government occasionally found it advisable to refresh the basis of consent by military parades and other displays of the force at its disposal. Such evidence of force in the background contributed to the granting of consent.

In other circumstances, force has the opposite impact on consent. Great Britain has, in the past, exercised limited authority over Egypt on a basis of consent inspired, in some measure, by respect for British power. Yet the display of British force, when it took the active form of defending the Suez Canal by shooting Egyptians who were threatening its security, tended to inflame the Egyptian people against the British and so to diminish the element of consent that entered into the support of Britain's position. Here force, instead of contributing to the enlargement of consent, tended to dissipate it.

It is useful to remind ourselves of the fact that even the great military empires of history established themselves effectively and securely only when the relationship of force to consent was, more or less, such as is exemplified by the "handful of Englishmen" in central Africa. That is to say, even the power of the great empires depended overwhelmingly on consent; but the consent itself had to have a backing of force, although it was rarely put to active and overt use. Just as the reserves of a bank do not nearly equal its financial commitments, so the force available to the greatest empires has never been nearly equal to their imperial commitments. The difference is made good, in each case, by the disposition of men to accept the possibility for the deed.

Now, if this is true in an essentially domestic situation—that is to say, where an imperial regime maintains actual jurisdiction over subject peoples—how much more is it true in the field of foreign affairs! In foreign affairs, where it is not a question of rulers and ruled but of relations between independent states, the potential of consent that a nation enjoys in the world is the overwhelmingly preponderant factor in its national power, and the eliciting of consent must be the prime object of its foreign policy and its diplomacy.

Restraint Imposed on Leadership

One conclusion to which this leads was well stated in 1907 by Mr. Eyre Crowe, Chief Clerk of the British Foreign Office, in a memorandum to the Foreign Secretary. He wrote:

It would . . . be but natural that the power of a State supreme at sea should inspire universal jealousy and fear, and be ever exposed to the danger of being overthrown by a general combination of the world. Against such a combination no single nation could in the long run stand, least of all a small island kingdom not possessed of the military strength of a people trained to arms, and dependent for its food supply on oversea commerce. The danger can in practice only be averted . . . on condition that the national policy of the insular and naval State is so directed as to harmonize with the general desires and ideals common to all mankind, and more particularly that it is closely identified with the primary and vital interests of a majority, or as many as possible, of the other nations.

This passage bears with some force of logic on the position in which our own country finds itself today. We cannot exercise effective world leadership except as we show our regard for the interests of those who accept our leadership, or whose acceptance of our leadership we seek. This is, perhaps, an obvious point; but it is at variance with the view of those who would have us shape our policy only according to the narrowest and most self-regarding appreciation of our national interests.

Surely we are mistaken when we believe that a position of responsible leadership should allow us greater freedom of action rather than less. Most political leaders owe what freedom of action they have to the confidence of their constituents, and that confidence stems, in part, from the assurance the constituents feel that the leadership has their interests at heart. As was still true of Britain 46 years ago, a large view of our national interest today necessarily embraces the national interests of all those countries that accept our leadership.

Primary reliance on consent—or, as we commonly put it, on “good will”—is an American tradition. It is exemplified in our historic attitudes toward war and peace, our emphasis on the settlement of disputes by negotiation, our disposition to conclude wars by peace settlements designed to “bind up the wounds of war” and assuage its animosities. Historically, we have tended, if anything, to underrate the need for force to insure our interests. We have not fully understood the force-consent equation. This may be seen in our original espousal of a League of Nations that would maintain the peace largely by marshaling “world opinion,” our sponsorship of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and our demobilization in 1945 before the peace settlement had been made. The failure fully to understand this equation could just as easily lead, by revulsion of opinion, to the other extreme—that is, to a reliance on force that cost us, in loss of consent, more than it contributed to our security.

Nowhere has the ultimate ascendancy of our traditional attitude been more fully and more fruitfully exemplified than in the history of our Latin American policy. When, in the first two decades of this century, we temporarily wielded the “big stick” among the disorderly states surrounding the Caribbean, the effect was to array all the Latin American states—right down to the Horn—almost solidly against us. If we were going to get what we needed from them, we were faced with something like a choice between subjugating and holding them all by force, or reversing our policy. The dramatic reversal of our policy in the 1930's, coupled with an increase in their dependence on us in consequence of World War II, converted them into allies at a time when we could not well have afforded to hold them as subjects.

Communist Experience

Although this is not the place for it, a full analysis of Communist tactics in terms of force and consent might prove enlightening. In the first instance the Communists have sought to gain the allegiance of peoples through promises, propaganda, and partisan organization. The original strategists of communism, while they expected to use force, cherished a vision of the future in which the proletarian masses of the world would rise up with positive enthusiasm to overthrow their capitalist “masters.”

These original Communists were wrong in many of their preconceptions. They were wrong in their view that the proletarian classes were, by nature, internationalistic in their thinking. They were wrong in supposing that the Communists would first come to power in the most industrialized countries. Finally, they were wrong in their expectations of mass proletarian support. One might make a case for the proposition that failure to gain the expected allegiance of the toiling masses everywhere has been accompanied by an ever-increasing dependence on force to realize the objectives of the Communist movement.

The Russian “Revolution” of November 1917 was no revolution in the sense of an uprising of the masses. The masses of Russia were peasants, not proletarians. The Czarist regime and its governmental organization had already broken down and been swept away in the spring of 1917. Lenin and his Bolsheviks figured virtually not at all in that breakdown. They represented one minority group among the revolutionists of the day. The so-called “Revolution” of November was, in fact, a *coup d'état*, a seizure of power by this minority group of conspirators. Right at the start, then, Lenin and his band found themselves in a position in which they could not have governed except by force, whatever their inclinations, for they lacked the consent of the governed. Almost as soon as it had been brought into being, they had to dis-

solve the one representative organ of government that existed, the Constituent Assembly, since they found themselves overwhelmingly outvoted in it.

In his foreign policy, also, Lenin apparently placed his reliance on popular disaffection in other countries to an extent that proved unwarranted. He adopted an overtly anti-nationalistic and anti-imperialistic foreign policy, feeling he could afford to, perhaps, in the expectation that Russia's neighbors were just about to have their own proletarian revolutions, after which they would join his team. Consequently, he foreswore the traditional territorial aspirations of the Russian state—such as to acquire control of the Turkish Straits—and he abandoned such spheres of influence as that which Russia had enjoyed in northern Persia. A wide autonomy was proclaimed for the minor nationalities within Russia's borders. And in 1920 Soviet Russia voluntarily renounced her extraterritorial rights in China and her special privileges in North Manchuria.

The Soviet leaders were manifestly reluctant to lose faith in the efficacy of propaganda and subversion, independent of military force, as the initial means of achieving their objectives. They must, however, have found food for thought in the evidence of the 1930's that communism could not compete successfully with nationalism, in a free market, for the allegiance of the proletariat. The requirements of power at all costs, in such a situation, led to the development of an enlarged role for the Red Army. As late as 1939, however, the Kremlin appears not to have learned this lesson with finality. The Red Army, in its initial progress across the Finnish borders, carried portraits of Lenin and Stalin designed to seduce the Finnish masses and enlist their support. The failure of seduction left no alternative to rape. In the conclusion of World War II the Soviet conspirators no longer hesitated to impose the Revolution on their neighbors in Eastern Europe by the imminent threat of the Red Army. This use of force, however, has been costly in terms of the consent of those who live outside the shadow of the Red Army.

The question of *consent* or *force* arises most clearly in those situations in which a nation is seeking to exercise a sort of supremacy with respect to other nations. It is the question whether it is better to have followers, bound to one by friendship and common interest, or to have satellites, held to obedience by force. It is the question of command as practiced in a police state or of leadership as practiced in a democracy. It is the question of what one may lose, in the way of willing followers, if one should start making satellites.

This is the form, roughly, in which the question arose for us in our relations with Latin America. Here we abandoned a policy of force, which was succeeding badly, in favor of a policy of consent.

It is in this form that the question arose with respect to Soviet foreign policy—and here the Soviet Union has resorted increasingly to sheer military force.

The Limits of Interventionism

A possible variant to the policy of gaining national objectives by eliciting the consent of those who have jurisdiction is to assure jurisdiction for a regime which accords its consent. Such an undertaking may, on rare occasions, be valid and feasible; but all modern history warns that it is likely to be an enticement into quicksands. The only way one can assure jurisdiction, abroad, for a regime that cannot assure jurisdiction for itself is by a species of intervention that, in addition to dissipating the popular consent which the intervening nation might otherwise enjoy, dissipates the consent on which the imposed regime must base itself if it is to establish a tolerable government. When a nation intervenes in a foreign country, it not only tends to turn the people of that country against it, but it also discredits the regime that accepts its support.

You would think that, if there had been any place in the world where we could have picked governments of our liking, it would have been in the republics around the Caribbean, which lie in the shadow of our might. Yet even in El Salvador, which is hardly bigger than Maryland, at a time when it had a population well under a million, the refusal of the United States to recognize the Government of General Martinez did not weaken his position; the only result was that El Salvador was prompted to embarrass us by becoming the one country in the world, beside Fascist Italy, to recognize the puppet government set up by the Japanese in Manchuria.

In other cases we have done more than to refuse recognition to a regime we did not like. For a time we actually determined who would govern Nicaragua, who would govern Haiti, and who would govern Santo Domingo. The "who" in each case was the United States Marines—and they must vividly recall what a hero Sandino, "the George Washington of Nicaragua," became for opposing them. We got our fingers burned, also, when we intervened to keep Huerta from governing Mexico.

The history of interventions in China has its resemblances and its differences. There are, certainly, quite valid points of difference. When civil war is chronic in a country in which your nationals reside and in which you have abundant interests, when the government of such a country is utterly unable to control its territories or even its officials, it is hard to refrain from taking steps to establish order yourself and promoting the interests of the side you would like to see win. The Western world has, consequently, been intervening in China's civil strife since the 17th cen-

tury, and it has occasionally found itself on the losing side. That is to say, it has supported with force regimes that nevertheless slipped from power, and it has paid the price in the hostility of the regimes that came to power in spite of its opposition.

The Ming Dynasty was in the last stages of decadence in the 17th century, retreating southward before the advance of the Manchu invaders and usurpers. The Europeans in China supported the retreating Ming defenders. The English entered into close relations with Coxinga, one of the defending Ming chieftains who managed to hang onto Formosa and a few coastal points when the rest of China had been won by the Manchus. When, in 1683, Coxinga's son and successor finally surrendered to the Manchus, the English, naturally, did not find the new Manchu regime disposed to respect their interests. They had an unhappy time of it, consequently, for a generation or two. Forcible intervention, here, failed of its objective and at the same time imposed upon them a heavy cost in the element of consent.

Lesson for Our Times

One conclusion to which all this should *not* lead is that the United States is generally free, in its international relations, to choose categorically between a policy of consent and a policy of compulsion. This distinction of policy, in fact, becomes tenuous in its application to relations among great, independent, rival powers. Here the price of consent is likely to be appeasement—which is disastrous in any nation's policy. Our relations with the Soviet Union today require the utmost development of our strength as a Nation. And this would be true even if the Soviet Union should become cooperative, for it would be our strength that disposed her to be cooperative. Again, any possibility that we might have had of achieving mutual agreement with Japan in the twenties and thirties would certainly have depended on the strength of our naval forces in the Pacific. In other words, in the relationships between great independent powers, consent may be virtually a function of force—although the utmost care and a good deal of restraint must always be used in exercising that force.

The chief things that we, the American people, must bear in mind, if our Government is to manage our foreign affairs prudently, is that it must keep our commitments and our power in balance, that a major element in this economy is the consent of those whom we wish to associate with us, and that this consent requires flexibility, discipline, and a high sense of responsibility in the general management of our power.

• *Mr. Halle, author of the above article, is a member of the Policy Planning Staff.*

Treaty With Ethiopia To Become Effective

Press release 488 dated September 9

Ratifications of the treaty of amity and economic relations with Ethiopia were exchanged on September 8 at Addis Ababa. By its terms the treaty will enter into force on October 8, one month after the exchange of ratifications.

The treaty was signed at Addis Ababa on September 7, 1951. It was approved by the United States Senate on July 21 of this year and was formally ratified by President Eisenhower on August 4.

On coming into effect, the treaty will replace in full the treaty of commerce of 1914. The new treaty substitutes for the now outmoded provisions of the treaty of 1914 a set of provisions designed to regulate basic economic relations between the two countries in accordance with modern standards and to direct the future development of those relations along mutually beneficial lines. It contains provisions on basic personal freedom, property rights, investment and business activities generally, taxation, exchange regulations, the treatment of imports and exports, and other matters affecting the status and activities of the citizens and enterprises of either country when within the territories of the other. To these have been added a number of articles on the privileges and immunities of diplomatic and consular officers.

Ratification of the new treaty by the two countries affirms in the sphere of economic affairs the friendly and cooperative spirit that characterizes their relations in all spheres of activity and which has been strikingly manifested in recent months by their joint efforts against aggression in Korea.

Arrival of Japanese Crown Prince

Press release 483 dated September 8

Following are the texts of a statement of welcome made by Secretary Dulles to His Imperial Highness Akihito, Crown Prince of Japan, on his arrival at the Washington National Airport on September 8 and the reply of Crown Prince Akihito:

Secretary Dulles

Your Imperial Highness:

I am most happy to welcome you and the distinguished members of your suite to Washington. I am particularly happy because I have the honor to know His Majesty, your father, and it is a joy to welcome here his son.

We earnestly hope that, as you travel through

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our country during the next several weeks and as you become better acquainted with the United States, you will gain an enduring conception of American life and institutions and an appreciation of the sincere good wishes of the American people for Japan, as represented in your person. We shall feel that, in doing so, another strong and vital bond has been forged between our two countries.

As the Crown Prince of Japan and the Heir Apparent of an ancient throne, you represent the noblest traditions of the Japanese people and, at the same time, the hopes and aspirations of a new and vigorous democracy. We are deeply honored by your visit. It will, I know, contribute to the mutual knowledge and understanding of the peoples of Japan and the United States and reinforce

the spirit of their traditional friendship. We greet you.

His Imperial Highness

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your kind words of welcome. In turn, I extend the good wishes of my people to the people of your great democracy.

My visit to the United States is unofficial, but I am impressed to know that your people are giving generously of their valuable time to welcome me and to acquaint me with the many good things of your country.

In the course of my journey I shall try my best to observe various aspects of life in the United States so that I may be able to take home with me many things which will be valuable in my future days.

Construction of Rama Road in Nicaragua

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 472 dated September 2

The Department of State exchanged notes on September 2 with the Embassy of Nicaragua which will make possible the expenditure of \$1 million of U.S. funds for the construction of the Rama Road in Nicaragua.

The Rama Road, an east-west highway in Nicaragua 165 miles long, was begun in 1942. Four million dollars was allotted at that time from the President's emergency fund for national defense to carry out this work, but the funds were depleted by 1948 with about 68 miles of the road remaining to be constructed but with 97 miles in a useable gravel all-weather condition. The Nicaraguan Government has maintained the road well and has begun its extension into the rain forest toward Rama.¹

As was mentioned in the Department's note of reply to the note of the Ambassador of Nicaragua requesting the continued cooperation of the United States in the construction of the road, the United States is extremely gratified that the construction of the Rama Road is being resumed and that its completion is nearer reality. It is also pointed out that as these transportation facilities are improved, new material resources will be developed, additional markets opened, and local economic conditions benefited by this road.

¹ For additional background information, see BULLETIN of Mar. 3, 1952, p. 357.

TEXT OF NICARAGUAN NOTE

SEPTEMBER 2, 1953

EXCELLENCY,

I have the honor to inform you that my Government desires to obtain the assistance of the Government of the United States of America in the construction of the Rama Road envisaged in Public Law 413 of the 82nd Congress of the United States, approved June 25, 1952.

In accordance with the terms of Section 5 of this legislation, I request in the name of my Government that the Government of the United States continue its cooperation in the survey and construction of the Rama Road. I am pleased to give the formal assurances of my Government that it:—

(1) will provide, without participation of funds authorized by the United States legislation referred to, all necessary right-of-way for the construction of said highway, which right-of-way shall be of a minimum width where practicable of one hundred meters in rural areas and fifty meters in municipalities and shall forever be held inviolate as a part of the highway for public use;

(2) will not impose any highway toll, or permit any such toll to be charged for the use of said highway by vehicles or persons;

(3) will not levy or assess, directly or indirectly, any fee, tax, or other charge for the use of said road by vehicles or persons from the United States that does not apply equally to vehicles or persons of such Republic;

(4) will continue to grant reciprocal recogni-

tion of vehicle registration and drivers' licenses in accordance with the provisions of the Convention for the Regulation of Inter-American Automotive Traffic, which was opened for signature at the Pan American Union in Washington on December 15, 1943, and to which such Republic and the United States are parties; or any other treaty or international convention establishing similar reciprocal recognition; and

(5) will maintain said road after its completion in proper condition adequately to serve the needs of present and future traffic.

It is also understood that the cooperation of the United States in the survey and construction of the Rama Road will apply only to the survey and construction of the road from San Benito to Rama and that a survey, but not the construction, of a road will be undertaken from Rama to El Bluff in the Republic of Nicaragua and all expenditures for material, equipment and supplies shall, whenever practicable, be made for products of the United States or the Republic of Nicaragua.

My Government is aware that the continued survey and construction authorized by Public Law 413 is to be under the administration of the Bureau of Public Roads, Department of Commerce of the United States. It is, therefore, the intention of the appropriate Nicaraguan authorities, following this exchange of notes, to reach a subsidiary agreement with the Bureau of Public Roads to carry out the provisions of Public Law 413.

If the foregoing assurances are satisfactory to the Government of the United States, the Nicaraguan Government will consider the present note and your reply concurring therein as constituting an agreement between our two Governments which shall enter into force on the date of your reply.

I take pleasure in availing myself of this opportunity to present to you the assurances of my highest consideration.

GUILLERMO SEVILLA-SACASA
Ambassador of Nicaragua

His Excellency
*The Secretary of State
The Department of State
Washington, D. C.*

TEXT OF U.S. REPLY

SEPTEMBER 2, 1953

EXCELLENCY:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's courteous note dated September 2, 1953, in which you request the cooperation of the Government of the United States of America in the continued survey and construction of the Rama Road in Nicaragua.

I take pleasure in informing Your Excellency that the assurances which you offer are satisfactory to the Government of the United States. It is, consequently, the intention of the Government of the United States to extend to the Government of Nicaragua the cooperation envisaged in Public Law 413 of the 82nd Congress of the United States, approved June 25, 1952.

It is understood that the appropriate authorities of the Nicaraguan Government will make a subsidiary agreement with the Bureau of Public Roads, Department of Commerce, to carry out the provisions of the law.

The Government of the United States is extremely gratified that the construction of the Rama Road in Nicaragua is being resumed and that its completion is nearer reality. Transportation facilities will be improved, new material resources developed, additional markets opened, and local economic conditions will be benefited by this road. It is sincerely believed that this road will serve not only as a link to increase the trade between our nations but also as another bond in the close friendship which happily already unites us.

In accordance with the suggestion contained in Your Excellency's note, that note and this reply shall be considered as constituting an agreement between our two Governments, which shall enter into force on the date of this reply.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

WALTER B. SMITH
Under Secretary

His Excellency
Señor Dr. DON GUILLERMO SEVILLA-SACASA,
Ambassador of Nicaragua.

Loans to Nicaragua

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development announced on September 4 that on that date it had made two loans totaling \$3,950,000 to Nicaragua: \$3,500,000 for highway construction and \$450,000 for electric power. The highway project is a further step in a long-range program to develop an adequate road system in Nicaragua. The power project will provide a new diesel electric unit which should help ease the serious power shortage in the area of Managua, the national capital.

Although Nicaragua is essentially an agricultural country, large areas of cultivable land are still undeveloped because of inadequate transportation, and the construction of roads is of high priority. Under the highway program a system of all-weather highways is being constructed to link Managua, the provincial capitals, and seaports, and a network of farm-to-market roads will

be built to the main highways and around the principal cities.

Most of the loan will be used to help finance the farm-to-market network. It consists of 43 all-weather feeder and access roads, totaling 430 miles in 14 departments of the Republic and should stimulate production in areas now incapable of full development. The loan will also help to finance the construction of two roads in the main highway system. These will complete a further step of the main highway program, for which the bank lent Nicaragua \$3.5 million in June 1951.

When the secondary roads are completed, trucks should be able to provide transportation at one-fifth to one-tenth of present costs; commerce of all kinds should be greatly stimulated; and farm production can be expected to increase by about 30 percent. The opening up of more extensive areas suitable for tractor operations will stimulate further mechanization in the production of staple crops. In addition, large increases can be expected in coffee and cattle production. Many regions to be penetrated by the roads are highland areas where coffee could be grown in quantity. Nicaragua has long enjoyed a good market for live cattle. Now, however, only hardy cattle of poor beef quality can survive the rigorous journey over rough mountain trails to market, and cattle growers have no incentive to raise better stock. Better roads and truck transportation can be expected to stimulate the production of improved strains of cattle.

In some areas the new roads will encourage the use of forest resources. Although both hardwoods and softwoods are abundant in Nicaragua, lumber is scarce and expensive. The new feeder roads will serve also as access roads into timbered areas which cannot at present be profitably exploited.

The total cost of the present road project is estimated to be the equivalent of \$5,170,000. The bank's loan of \$3,500,000 will finance the imported equipment, materials, and services required, and the remaining costs will be met by Nicaragua out of its own resources. The loan is for a term of 10 years and carries interest at 4¾ percent, including the 1 percent commission which, under the bank's articles of agreement, is allocated to a special reserve. Amortization payments will begin on March 15, 1957.

The development of hydroelectric resources is the ultimate goal of the Government's power program. Preliminary surveys are now being made to determine the most suitable sites for hydroelectric installations. In the meantime, the Government, with the assistance of private consultants, is preparing an interim study of means to meet the growing industrial, commercial, and domestic needs of Managua and other major centers of population. This project, besides furnishing additional supplies of power, would make it

possible to integrate the services of the Managua plants and those of other principal cities.

Immediate measures are needed, however, to ease the serious power shortage in the Managua area. Notwithstanding the installation of a 3,000-kilowatt unit which went into operation early in 1953, demands have grown so rapidly that they still exceed supply. Power is rationed after 5 p. m., and no new customers of any kind are being served. The bank's loan will be used to finance an identical imported 3,000-kilowatt unit, already on order. This new unit should meet the unsatisfied demand of about 33 percent of the present load of just over 6,100 kilowatts.

The power loan is for a term of 10 years and carries interest of 4¾ percent including the 1 percent statutory commission. Amortization payments will begin on March 15, 1955.

The new loans are the fourth and fifth the bank has made for the economic development of Nicaragua, and they bring the total lent to \$9,200,000. In June 1951, at the same time as it made the \$3.5 million highway loan, the bank lent \$1.2 million to the Banco Nacional de Nicaragua to finance the purchase of agricultural machinery. In October 1951 the bank lent the Government \$550,000 for the purchase and installation of a grain storage plant.

Good progress has been made under these earlier loans. Some of the roads under construction will be completed before the end of the year. The agricultural equipment is being used by farmers throughout the most important agricultural areas. Although the first amortization payment of \$37,500 was not due until March 1954, a prepayment of \$245,000 was made on the agricultural equipment loan in April 1953.

Haiti Joins International Monetary Fund and Bank

The International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development jointly announced on September 8 that the Republic of Haiti on that day became a member of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development when the articles of agreement of these institutions were signed at Washington on behalf of the Government of Haiti by Jacques Léger, Ambassador for Haiti in the United States.

The quota of the Republic of Haiti in the International Monetary Fund is \$2,000,000, and its subscription to the capital stock of the bank is 20 shares with a total par value of \$2,000,000.

Fifty-five nations are now members of the fund and of the bank. Admission of Haiti brought the total of members' quotas in the fund to \$8,738,500,000. The total subscribed capital of the bank is now \$9,038,500,000.

President's Semiannual Report on the Mutual Security Program


The President transmitted to the Congress on August 17 a "Report on the Mutual Security Program for the Six Months Ended June 30, 1953."¹ Printed below are the texts of the President's letter and chapter I of the Report, entitled, "A Program for Long-Term Security." Titles of the other chapters are "Europe," "The Near East and Africa," "South Asia and the Far East," "American Republics," and "Other Parts of the Program."

PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

To the Congress of the United States:

I am transmitting herewith the Report on the Mutual Security Program covering operations during the 6 months ended June 30, 1953, in furtherance of the purposes of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended.

In the Mutual Security Program we find tangible expression of our belief that the safety and self-interest of this Nation are inextricably tied in with the security and well-being of other free nations.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
August 17, 1953.

A PROGRAM FOR LONG-TERM SECURITY

The first half of 1953 was a period of concrete achievement for the Mutual Security Program. It was a period of intensive policy reexamination and forward planning, of operational overhaul and streamlining, and of encouraging progress in free world defense and development.

A New Look at Mutual Security

The present administration assumed the reins of government on January 20, 1953. On that date, it assumed also a solemn obligation to the American people to reexamine most carefully the

entire complex of existing arrangements for their security. The Mutual Security Program for building the defenses and resources of the free world stood particularly high on the list of those arrangements. For this reason, a fresh and searching look was focused on our mutual security operations with other nations.

The new Director for Mutual Security, Harold E. Stassen, promptly initiated an intensive review of mutual security aims, methods, and working activities. Concurrently, the basic concepts and undertakings of the program were carefully analyzed by the National Security Council in relation to our country's whole security structure and financial capabilities.

The Director also enlisted the help of a special group of 55 outstanding leaders of American industry and finance in surveying all phases of the program in 14 countries which have accounted for the largest expenditures in recent years. These businessmen, who served without compensation, visited Europe, the Near East, and Far East to make an on-the-spot study of actual operations at the local levels.

The evaluation survey resulted in a number of valuable recommendations designed to streamline our foreign operational procedures, cut down duplication and overlapping, and eliminate blurred delegations of authority.

The Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury and the Director for Mutual Security held numerous personal discussions, both in this country and abroad, with high officials of our partner nations to achieve a first-hand exchange of views on today's vital military and economic issues. These leaders of the Administration also took part in the Paris meeting of the North Atlantic Council which laid down current military plans for western defense.

In short, the whole fabric of our worldwide security objectives and operations was closely examined.

Where We Stand

As a result of their review of security operations and overall foreign policy objectives, top administration officials reached certain fundamental conclusions. It is upon these conclusions that the present Mutual Security Program is built.

¹ H. doc. 226, 83d Cong., 1st sess.

THE THREAT OF GROWING SOVIET POWER

The United States continues to be seriously threatened by Soviet military and political expansionism. There is no real evidence that this threat has diminished or will diminish within the foreseeable future. The Soviet Union retains the capacity for aggression, and it has demonstrated aggressive intentions on numerous occasions in the recent past. Its future intentions remain an uncertain quantity.

The Soviet Union and its satellites, including the mainland of China, occupy about 13 million square miles—almost one-fourth of the earth's surface. This vast spread of Soviet-dominated territory has enough manpower and natural resources to enable the Soviet bloc to develop an economic base matching our own.

There is every evidence that the industrial output of the Soviet bloc is growing rapidly. Results of a recent study by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe show that, at the present pace of expansion, the Soviet Union by 1960 will be producing at least as much of the major raw materials as the seven most industrialized countries of Western Europe. By 1955, Soviet plans call for the production of more oil than Western Europe is currently consuming. Even today, the U. S. S. R. is estimated to be turning out annually more than twice the steel it produced per year to fight the last war.

The Soviet Union continues to maintain the largest armed force in peacetime history. General Ridgway has recently publicly reported that the Soviet Army has approximately 175 active divisions. The Soviet Air Force has some 20,000 front-line aircraft, with a large aircraft reserve. The Navy includes more than 350 submarines, many of the latest type. Army strength of the European satellites has grown, in the postwar years, from 45 to over 75 divisions. Advanced types of jet fighters, long-range bombers, and heavy tanks continue to roll off Soviet production lines in large numbers. Meanwhile, the possibilities of Russia's ever-growing capabilities for atomic-attack should be kept in the forefront of our defense planning.

Since the death of Stalin, the Soviet Union has made certain gestures which have aroused the hopes of the peoples of the world for a reduction of tension and a restoration of general peace. But these gestures have been accompanied by insignificant concrete actions. However fervently the free peoples may hope for peace, it would be suicidal to base our policies and programs on these hopes, without solid evidence of Soviet good faith. Until conditions for genuine peace have been firmly established, the security of the free world must depend upon its strength.

The Soviet threat is not military alone, but political and economic as well. The Communist imperialists seek constantly to capitalize on the

internal weaknesses of free nations and have demonstrated their ability, through political and economic subversion, to seize new territories without engaging the Soviet armies.

ADDED THREATS TO WORLD PEACE

Coalitions for resistance to aggression and the strengthening of defenses constitute the first requirements for survival and progress. But such measures are inescapably tied in with the economic advancement and development of free nations. Enduring military strength cannot be built on a shaky economic foundation. Nor can freedom itself live for long in an atmosphere of social stagnation and marginal living standards.

Poor productivity, narrow markets, underdeveloped resources, lack of technical abilities, inadequate diet, insufficient output, high incidence of disease, low literacy rates, weak public administration, instable government—wherever these exist, they offer attractive opportunities to Communist expansion and put a powerful check on the forward movement of free people everywhere.

A program for the security of the free world must embrace measures to help remove these stumbling blocks and clear the path to a better future for all.

Healthy, strong and progressive, our partner nations can constitute a tremendous asset to the spiritual and material strength of the free world. Neglected, weakened and subverted, they can be the means of tearing the free world asunder.

OUR SECURITY DEPENDS ON MUTUAL SECURITY

American security is inseparable from the security of other free nations. We are linked with other free peoples not only by common ideals, but also by mutual needs. Our nation cannot stand alone. It is strong and powerful, but it is not omnipotent.

The cold fact is that our rapidly expanding economy has outgrown our resource base. Our industrial output is almost altogether dependent on outside sources for tin, mica, asbestos, natural rubber, chrome, nickel, manganese, cobalt, and other vital materials. Without these imports, our economy would rapidly shrivel up. In addition, we are the world's largest importer of copper, lead, and zinc. Even crude petroleum and iron ore—once traditional symbols of American self-sufficiency—are now on our list of net imports.

Further Communist expansion into new areas of the free world would not only strike at American economic health but would also add enormously to the military and economic potential of the aggressor. Whenever any country falls victim to Russian domination, its farms, factories, and raw materials are automatically subtracted from the side of the free world and are harnessed to the

Soviet war machine. Thus, the aggressor becomes stronger and the United States becomes weaker. If such a process were permitted to continue, it is inevitable that the Soviet Union would eventually become more powerful than the United States. We would then face an uphill fight for survival.

OUR ALLIES PROVIDE NEEDED STRENGTH

Aside from America's interest in preventing the population and resources of other nations from being added to the Soviet war potential, we also recognize that many of these nations can make a substantial positive contribution to our own defense. They have the manpower, industrial production, technical skills, and natural resources which might prove to be the decisive factor in deterring or resisting aggression.

It is no longer realistic to consider America's security position solely in terms of our national defense facilities. Any determination of the size of the military forces required to protect this country in event of war must depend in great part upon the size and quality of the military forces under the control of allied nations. The amount of money which America must spend each year for defense purposes is directly related to the extent of the defense efforts made by our partners abroad. The adequacy of our protection can only be measured by assessing the total strength of the free world. Therefore, where America can contribute to building the strength of other free nations without serious sacrifice of its own strength, the net result is to enhance the overall security of the American people.

United States military and economic assistance can maximize the contribution of other nations to the overall defense of the free world. Many free nations possess some of the things needed to develop and maintain effective defense forces, but lack other things. For example, a nation may have brave soldiers but lack equipment. It may be able to produce small arms and ammunition but unable to produce tanks, planes or electronic equipment. Or again, a nation may possess factories capable of producing certain modern weapons but be unable to activate these factories because of economic difficulties.

A program of American assistance, carefully adapted to the needs of the individual country, can often supply the "missing link" in the defense structure and permit that country to achieve modern, balanced forces. Thus, because the United States pays only a part of the cost, the total defense power made possible by American assistance is far greater than could be produced by the same expenditure of money and resources for other purposes.

For the foregoing reasons, it is evident that what we make available to other nations in military equipment, economic resources and technical help is not a "give-away program," but is a sound

and high-yielding investment in national safety. International security expenditures represent less than 10 percent of our national budgetary expenditures. In terms of the total effort of the free world the cost is small, but in terms of increased strength the dividends are enormous.

Where We Are Heading

MUTUAL SECURITY AIMS REDEFINED

The direction of our leadership is determined by the nature of the problem before us. The problem of achieving mutual security is many-sided. The Mutual Security Program must, accordingly, press forward on all fronts with these key objectives:

First.—To attain and maintain within the framework of democratic institutions the defensive strength, political stability, and economic growth which is necessary for the free world.

Second.—To build for the United States and our partner nations an effective counterforce against totalitarian aggression, pacing the necessary military buildup so that it does not outstrip our collective economic capabilities. For us, as well as our allies, a judicious balance must be maintained between the military effort and economic stability.

Third.—To strengthen the efforts of the peoples of the free world in realizing their full capabilities for developing their resources within expanding economies and stable political situations. This applies particularly to the economically underdeveloped areas where a sound economic foundation is essential for the growth of democratic institutions. Only in this way can we jointly root out those conditions which invite subversion, weaken the will for freedom, and imperil the survival of democracy.

Fourth.—To strengthen the efforts towards regional political, military, and economic integration, thereby broadening the base of our collective strength.

Finally.—To retain at all times the initiative for peace. The Mutual Security Program is proof in being that the United States leads with genuine deeds—not merely words—in the determined quest for world peace.

In moving toward these objectives, the needs and problems of the United States and other nations of the free world must always be considered from a global standpoint. Action in one area of the world must be weighed in relation to reactions in other areas. It is equally essential that the United States operations to carry out these programs be administered in such a manner that maximum value is attained for the funds and effort expended.

PLANNING FOR THE LONG PULL

Mutual security planning must be of a long-range nature. Just as we have no evidence that

the threat to our security has diminished, neither can we predict a date on which this threat may reach maximum proportions.

Any program so far-reaching in purpose and so vital to national safety and well-being calls for integrated and carefully thought out planning. Obviously, we cannot proceed efficiently with a patchwork of disjointed ideas or a series of emergency improvisations. Nor is it good policy to operate with day-to-day, blow-hot-blow-cold methods in meeting conditions that promise to be with us for a number of years.

What plans we make should be designed so that the efforts of the United States and our allies can be carried forward with maximum efficiency and minimum strain over a sustained period. This means building steadily at a pace our respective economies can bear without breaking.

We simply cannot aim for a fixed target by a fixed date, as if we were preparing for a D-day of our own making. We have no aggressive intent. The potential threat to our security is both immediate and long term. We must move forward with flexibility of action and continuity of purpose. Only in this way can deep-rooted and lasting results be achieved.

A Period of Achievement

The first 6 months of the year witnessed a number of noteworthy accomplishments in our Mutual Security Program which measurably advanced the objectives of free world security.

Tightening the Framework.—It was evident to the Administration that the organizational and administrative structure through which the Mutual Security Program had been operated needed thorough revision. Organizational arrangements for the conduct of foreign affairs had been built upon numerous separate statutes. This resulted in a scattering of programs within the Executive Branch. The new Administration found considerable duplication and conflict of responsibilities and powers in existing activities aimed at providing military, economic, and technical assistance to foreign countries. Therefore, it was essential to take steps to tighten lines of responsibility, prevent duplication, and promote operating efficiency.

On June 1, by Executive order, the President transferred to the jurisdiction of the Director for Mutual Security the operating responsibilities for certain United States technical assistance programs, formerly vested in the Secretary of State.² The Director also assumed operating functions with respect to United States participation in international programs of technical assistance, relief and rehabilitation, and refugees.

Simultaneously, the President announced a plan for reorganizing the departments of the United

States Government concerned with the conduct of its affairs overseas.³ The plan reaffirmed the historic responsibility of the Department of State as the agency responsible for the development and control of foreign policy and relations with foreign governments. It also reasserted the responsibility of the Chief of Diplomatic Mission for providing effective coordination of, and policy direction with respect to, all United States Government activities in a foreign country. This reorganization plan became effective on August 1, 1953.

The new organization regroups foreign assistance and related economic operations within a single agency, the Foreign Operations Administration. The Office of the Director for Mutual Security and the Mutual Security Agency are abolished, and the functions transferred to the FOA. The Office of the United States Representative in Europe is also abolished. A new United States mission (United States Mission to NATO and European Regional Organizations) is established. The chief of the mission reports to and receives instructions from the Secretary of State. Representatives of the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Treasury, and the Director of the FOA are included in this mission.

This reorganization measure has been designed to achieve more unified direction and integrated operation of foreign assistance programs, as well as substantial economies and greater efficiency of operation.

Our Global Military Shipments Accelerated.—The value of shipments of military weapons and equipment to our allies continued to rise at an accelerating rate. Shipments in the first half of 1953 were almost two-thirds higher than during the preceding 6 months. Security restrictions do not permit publication of details by specific area, but on a global basis the major items delivered since the beginning of the program through May 31, 1953, included:

81,328 electronics and signal equipment items.

26,564 tanks and combat vehicles.

140,865 motor transport vehicles.

25,234 artillery pieces.

19,855,000 rounds of artillery ammunition.

510 Navy vessels.

4,126 aircraft.

Almost 1.5 million small arms and machine guns were shipped, along with about 738 million rounds of small arms and machine gun ammunition.

Military shipments to Indochina were made on a high priority basis and included vital artillery pieces, military vehicles, and certain types of necessary aircraft.

In Latin America, Brazil, Uruguay, and the Dominican Republic ratified the necessary agree-

² BULLETIN of June 15, 1953, p. 854.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 852.

ments to make them eligible for United States military assistance.

Increased Defense Efforts in Europe.—Our European allies have continued to increase their defense expenditures for troop pay, materiel, construction, and other military purposes. Since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, our allies have increased the level of their annual expenditures by 120 percent. Estimated European NATO defense expenditures for the 1952-53 fiscal year, according to the NATO Secretary-General are nearly \$12 billion, as against a little more than \$5 billion in 1949-50. Moreover, Western Europe's production of major military materiel for the year ended June 30, 1953, totaled more than \$3 billion, a fourfold increase over pre-Korean levels.

Offshore Procurement.—The end-items produced and shipped from the United States are being augmented by the offshore procurement program. During the first half of 1953, this program gained momentum in Europe, enabling the European nations to produce an increasing quantity of military equipment and supplies in their own factories. Through June 30, 1953, about \$2.2 billion had been awarded to the European countries in offshore procurement contracts by the United States military services. In addition, nearly \$38 million worth of offshore procurement contracts for materiel were awarded in Japan and Formosa.

More Strength for NATO.—Expanding defense efforts in Europe, while adding appreciably to NATO's defense capacity, have placed an increasing strain on European national resources. This was one of the major problems confronting the NATO cabinet ministers at the eleventh ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Paris in April. The United States delegation at this meeting was led by the Secretary of State, and included the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director for Mutual Security.

In reaching agreement on a firm military program for 1953 and a provisional program for 1954, the NATO ministers adopted measures to get greater strength by less costly and more practicable means. It was agreed that military needs must be kept in balance with economic realities, thus reducing the danger of excessive strain on the budgets of the NATO countries, including our own.

The program adopted provides for a continuing, gradual buildup in the number of NATO forces, and at the same time calls for greater emphasis on the quality of existing forces. Appreciable improvements in quality will be attained through better organization and training, and better equipment. Reserves of supplies and materials will be increased. It is estimated that quantitative increases plus qualitative improvements, in combi-

nation, will increase the overall combat effectiveness of NATO forces by as much as 30 percent during the current year.

At the April meeting, the NATO ministers also reached agreement on short-term and long-term plans for financing NATO airfields, bases, communications, and other facilities used in common by forces of different NATO countries, and reaffirmed the Council's support of the Treaty which will establish a European Defense Community.

Europe's Dollar Position Improved.—Most Western European countries have recently succeeded in improving their dollar payments positions. This favorable development, however, was to a large extent counterbalanced by the fact that the reduction in the dollar gap was achieved primarily through enforced restrictions on imports rather than through an expansion of exports.

Action by the Coal and Steel Community.—The European Coal and Steel Community moved into gear. On February 10, 1953, tariffs and quantitative restrictions on coal movements were removed. On May 1, the first steps were taken to open officially the common market for steel.

Suspension of Economic Aid to the Netherlands, Iceland, and Denmark.—In January, the Netherlands Government announced that, after careful consideration of the economic position of the country, it had decided not to request further defense-support aid. This accomplishment is especially noteworthy in view of the increase in the Dutch defense effort in NATO since Korea. The United States will continue its program of direct military aid in the form of arms and equipment for Dutch military, naval, and air forces. Technical assistance programs will also be continued.

In May, the Icelandic Government also suggested the suspension of further economic aid. At the same time, it expressed its deep appreciation for the effective and most welcome help which was given to Iceland in its time of need. The Minister of Commerce described in great detail, over the radio and in the press, the great debt owed the United States by Iceland for this very material economic aid.

In June, the Danish Government, too, proposed the suspension of defense-support aid in view of its improved financial position. Denmark's achievement in rebuilding its economic strength after the Nazi occupation of World War II is concrete evidence of both the Danish people's own great efforts and the effectiveness of our assistance programs.

Three more names were thus added to the list of those countries⁴ which have been enabled to regain their strength to the point where United States economic aid could be suspended.

Wheat to Pakistan.—Famine faced Pakistan as a result of two successive years of heavy drought.

⁴Belgium-Luxembourg, Ireland, Portugal, and Sweden. [Footnote in the original.]

Grave economic difficulties prevented the country from financing the necessary wheat imports by loan as it did in 1952.

To aid the Pakistani people in their time of need, the United States made available up to 1 million tons of wheat from surplus stocks. About 700,000 tons are being provided immediately on a grant basis. The necessary legislation was enacted on June 25, exactly 15 days after the President's emergency request. The first shipload of wheat left on June 26, and additional shipments are being made as rapidly as possible.

Mutual Development and Technical Assistance.—United States leadership in seeking world peace and progress goes beyond the pressing necessity to manufacture weapons, expand armies, and construct military barriers to aggression. Under the program for mutual development and technical assistance, we are helping other free nations to increase the output of food, raw materials and finished goods, to gain better health and education, to improve methods of transportation and public administration, and generally to raise their living standards.

There are at present over 2,000 American technicians in various parts of the world. These experts are working side by side with the people of our partner countries in all vital fields of development and training from labor productivity in Iran or livestock production in Honduras to disease control in India and thermal power generation in Formosa. Closely connected with these technical assistance measures are the essential commodities and machinery we are providing to help the participating countries achieve stronger economies which ultimately can be put on a self-supporting basis.

Emphasis for the Next Year.—For the fiscal year 1954, new funds totaling \$4.5 billion were appropriated for the Mutual Security Program. In addition to this amount, the Administration was authorized to carry over \$2.1 billion which was unobligated from appropriations of previous fiscal years.

The bulk of the new funds—\$3.2 billion—was earmarked for military assistance. A little under \$900 million was appropriated for defense-financing purposes, such as \$85 million each to Britain and France to back up their NATO military production, and a special fund of \$400 million for the Indochina campaign. A special-weapons item of \$50 million was made available to encourage the designing and initial production of new special weapons to be used in the mutual defense program. About \$350 million was appropriated for development and technical assistance programs, primarily for free Asia and the Near East.

Appropriations for multilateral organizations totaled almost \$80 million. The largest share of this amount, \$51 million, will be contributed to

the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency. The remainder will be used for such purposes as children's welfare, movement of migrants, and international technical assistance programs.

The Mutual Security Program takes into account the fact that the scope of the present threat is world-wide, although the emphasis of the threat may shift from one region to another as free world defenses are probed for weak spots. Mutual security operations therefore, are geared to build a security structure which will guarantee the greatest possible strength for the free world as a whole.

In drawing up the new fiscal year's program, emphasis was shifted more toward Asia and the Pacific. Including the special assistance for Indochina, about 37 percent of the new funds for the 1954 program will be for Asia, compared with 14 percent in the previous fiscal year. The European program will drop from 73 percent of the total funds in 1953 to 50 percent in 1954.

Aid Cannot Do It Alone

While it is clear that the strength needed by other free nations cannot be developed and maintained without substantial American assistance, it is equally clear that the Mutual Security Program alone cannot do the whole job. Other measures are necessary, and it is important that the Mutual Security Program and our foreign relations as a whole be conducted in such a way as to facilitate the taking of these measures.

First, the countries of the free world need to attain a greater degree of cooperation among themselves. In particular, it is evident that economic stability and the effective use of defense resources in Western Europe depend to a considerable extent upon European unification. The United States has consistently supported measures aimed at the integration of Western Europe and has been encouraged by the progress demonstrated by such bodies as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the European Payments Union, and the European Coal and Steel Community. At present, the United States Government is giving strong support to the treaty creating a European Defense Community, now before the European parliaments for ratification.

Second, it is clear that the economic health required for political and social stability and for a sustained defense effort depends largely upon expanding trade among the free nations. Just as a human being must exhale as well as inhale in order to live, so must a nation export as well as import to survive. To keep their economies functioning properly, the countries of Western Europe must turn to outside sources for needed machinery, wheat, cotton, tobacco, timber, chemicals, and consumer durables. Money for such imports can be earned only by selling to overseas buyers.

In 1938 Western Europe carried on two-way trade with Soviet Russia and what are now the European satellites in the amount of roughly \$1.8 billion. In 1952, they had reduced that trade, in comparable prices, to \$700 million—a drop of more than 60 percent. Japan's trade with the China mainland in 1938 was 20 percent of its total trade; today, it is merely a trickle—less than one-half of 1 percent.

Since we expect the European countries and Japan to continue to curtail their exports to Iron Curtain countries, we must help them find other markets and sources of supply. We must reexamine also the numerous restrictions which deny many European and Japanese manufacturers the opportunity to enter our markets.

Moreover, unreasonable administrative barriers against goods of other nations work against the overall economic interests of the United States. American farmers and businessmen currently sell abroad about \$15 billion annually of agricultural and industrial products. Unless other nations can earn their way by selling us their cheeses, woodpulp, nonferrous metals, silks, linens, chinaware, and perfumes, these same farmers and businessmen must be prepared to see their world markets shrink up accordingly. The curtailment of foreign markets in many cases would mean not only lower sales but very likely a reduction of receipts below the break-even point.

Third, there is general agreement that private investment capital is a vital ingredient in any plan for building the economies of other free nations, especially in the underdeveloped countries. With private capital, these countries in Asia, Africa, and our own hemisphere can turn their own resources to better advantage in advancing their economic development.

The countries themselves can take steps to supplement indigenous private venture capital. They can seek private capital from the more industrialized countries of Europe, from Japan, and from the United States by reducing the hazards to investment from abroad. Inequitable tax statutes, expropriation risks, unreasonable employment controls and exchange restrictions are factors which drive away the prospective investor.

The efforts of the countries to promote a more favorable investment climate are being assisted by the Mutual Security Program in several ways. Advice is given in the preparation of investment laws and codes. Investment opportunities are disseminated to the United States business community. The guaranty program offers investors protection against loss from expropriation and inconvertibility. Contracts with private firms demonstrate to the people of the underdeveloped areas that proper utilization of their resources by responsible companies that have the necessary technical knowledge and financial means will bring lasting benefit in terms of higher living

standards and greater national strength. Extending technical assistance, improving health conditions, and modernizing government fiscal procedures—all these activities being carried forward under the Mutual Security Program are helping to bring about a better climate for foreign investment.

Freedom, Peace, and World Prosperity

Mankind would be blessed indeed if all the purpose and planning, the effort and resources that now go to hammer out the weapons of war could be put into a great common effort to improve the hard lot of the less privileged. Unhappily, there is no magic formula to brew instant peace.

As long as the forces of aggression threaten to chain free men to the sordid ambitions of world domination, so long must the free nations persist in their collective efforts to build defensive strength.

The United States and its allies seek a way of security, security with strength that will eventually force an end to the cold war and at the same time keep us prepared for any turn of circumstances, security that will bring greater progress and prosperity to the whole world. With the Mutual Security Program, we are pursuing the best means to achieve our objective.

Establishment of USIA

Area Offices

Theodore C. Streibert, Director of the new U.S. Information Agency (USIA), announced on September 2 that in a reorganization move to provide supervision of overseas information operations in the field, four assistant-director positions had been established for the four geographic areas of the world.

The appointments to these positions are promotions from within the organization—Nedville E. Nordness for Europe, William L. Clark for the American Republics, Saxton Bradford for the Far East, and G. Huntington Damon for the Near East, South Asia, and Africa.

The establishment of the four area offices by Mr. Streibert follows the instructions of the President's memorandum accompanying the Reorganization Plan No. 8,¹ which states that the new Agency should have parallel areas of responsibility to correspond to the regional bureaus of the Department of State.

These area offices will also provide the regional coordination of the program recommended by the Hickenlooper Committee.²

¹ BULLETIN of June 15, 1953, p. 855.

² The Senate Subcommittee for Overseas Information Programs of the United States.

U.S.-Soviet Lend-Lease Negotiations

Press release 494 dated September 11

Under Secretary Smith on September 11 called in Soviet Ambassador Georgi N. Zaroubin on the question of the lend-lease settlement negotiations and more particularly on the failure of the Soviet Government to honor its obligations to return lend-lease vessels to the United States. The Under Secretary reminded the Ambassador that the Soviet Government had not yet replied to this Government's notes of November 5, 1952,¹ and March 20, 1953, on this subject. He pointed out further that more than 6 years have elapsed since lend-lease negotiations were begun on April 30, 1947.² Accordingly the Under Secretary requested that the Government of the United States be informed at an early date of the intentions of the Soviet Government with respect to the return of U.S.-owned lend-lease vessels as required under article V of the Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942.

Procedures for Clemency and Parole for War Criminals

Following is the text of a statement issued at Bonn on September 1 by the Allied High Commission for Germany:

Orders providing for the establishment in each of the three zones of mixed consultative boards to make recommendations for clemency or parole with respect to war criminals have been signed by the High Commissioner of the French Republic in Germany, by the Acting British High Commissioner on behalf of the United Kingdom Commissioner, and, in the case of United States, jointly by the High Commissioner of the U.S. and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, Europe. The orders are being published in the *Official Gazette* of the Allied High Commission for Germany.

These orders give effect to the new procedures for clemency or parole with respect to war criminals as contemplated in the announcement of the Allied High Commissioners of July 20, 1953.³

¹ BULLETIN of Nov. 24, 1952, p. 819.

² For a summary of these negotiations, see *ibid.*, June 2, 1952, p. 879.

³ On July 20, the High Commission made the following announcement: "At the request of the Federal Chancellor, the Government of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States have considered proposals relating to future procedures for clemency with respect to, or parole of, war criminals. As a result, it has been decided to provide for the participation of persons nominated by the Federal Government in Consultative Boards in each of the three Zones to make recommendations for clemency or parole to the appropriate authorities in that Zone. Further details will be announced shortly."

September 21, 1953

They provide for the participation on the mixed consultative boards of persons nominated by the Federal Republic of Germany. The boards in the British and U.S. zones will consist of five members, of whom two will be nominated by the Federal Republic, and the board in the French zone will consist of seven members, of whom three will be nominated by the Federal Republic.

The tasks of the boards in each zone will be, without calling in question the validity of convictions and sentences, to make recommendations for clemency or parole to the appropriate authorities in that zone.

As it was stated in a letter to the Federal Chancellor on July 20,⁴ arrangements for these consultative boards are interim measures adopted at the request of Dr. Adenauer pending entry into force of the Bonn conventions.

Freedom of Movement for German Nationals

Text of U. S. Note

Press release 461 dated August 27

Following is the text of a note sent by U.S. High Commissioner James B. Conant to Soviet High Commissioner Vladimir Semenov on August 27 concerning removal of zonal barriers and freedom of movement between the Soviet and the Western Zones of Germany:

It has long been the policy of my government to remove the barriers which still exist in Germany between our two zones and to endeavor to secure freedom of movement for German Nationals between them. You will recall that for several years German Nationals living in the French, United Kingdom and United States zones have been able to move freely between these zones without interzonal passes while it is still necessary for Germans to possess them before they can travel between the United States and Soviet zones. The continuation of the system of interzonal passes between our respective zones has in my view no justification and I consequently hope that you will agree that we should jointly waive this requirement for German Nationals.

I therefore propose to you that we now jointly waive the allied interzonal pass requirement for the travel of German Nationals between and through the United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics zones. Simultaneously, the present German *Aufenthaltserlaubnis* [residence permit] requirement should be abolished by the German authorities. The responsible German authorities in the United States zone will suspend

⁴ Not printed.

the requirement of the *Aufenthaltserlaubnis* simultaneously with the waiver by us of the interzonal pass requirement. I hope that you will accept this proposal and that you will agree to make the necessary administrative arrangements in the Soviet zone so that German Nationals residing in Berlin, the Soviet zone and the United States zone of occupation will be able to travel freely between and through these zones of Germany and Berlin

on the simple presentation of their identity card. As soon as you have informed me that these administrative arrangements are to be made in the Soviet zone, I shall order the waiver of the interzonal pass requirement for German Nationals traveling between or through our zones.

I am informed that my British and French colleagues are approaching you with similar proposals.

Puerto Rico's New Political Status

U.S./U.N. press releases dated August 28

Following are the texts of statements by Mason Sears, U.S. Representative in the U.N. General Assembly's Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, and Antonio Fernos-Isern, Resident Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and U.S. alternate representative in that Committee, made in the Committee on August 28:

STATEMENT BY MR. SEARS

I wish to thank this Committee for permitting our delegation to take up the item on Puerto Rico at this time.

I think the members will find the discussion interesting and will understand in their hearts how happy the Governments of Puerto Rico and the United States are over what has been accomplished.

I am not going to present the main case, as that will be done by my friend, Dr. Fernos. But I would like to state briefly the four main events which have led up to the present situation.

The first was in 1948 when the Puerto Rican people held a national referendum to determine what kind of self-government they wanted. The question was whether they wanted to become (1) a state in our Federal Union, (2) completely independent, or (3) a commonwealth associated with

the United States. They chose the latter by an overwhelming vote.

The second event was when Dr. Fernos here presented legislation in Congress to give effect to the vote of the national referendum. This legislation became Public Law 600 in the Eighty-first Congress and authorized the Puerto Rican people to draft their own constitution.

The third event was the holding of a constitutional convention which was presided over by our friend, Dr. Fernos.

The fourth event was the ratification of the new constitution by the Congress of the United States and by the Puerto Rican people. Again the vote for ratification received an overwhelming majority.

A most interesting feature of the new constitution is that it was entered into *in the nature of a compact* between the American and the Puerto Rican people. A compact, as you know, is far stronger than a treaty. A treaty usually can be denounced by either side, whereas a compact cannot be denounced by either party unless it has the permission of the other.

This point has been particularly emphasized by Senator Butler of Nebraska, who was a principal cosponsor of Public Law 600. Senator Butler has gone on record to the effect that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has been created by a compact which may not be amended or abrogated by either side alone.

In addition to Senator Butler's statement, we have a ruling from the U.S. District Court for Puerto Rico, which is a U.S. court and not a Puerto Rican court. This court stated, and this is a direct quotation:

As a necessary legal consequence of said compact, neither the Congress of the United States nor the people of Puerto Rico can unilaterally amend Public Law 600 nor the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act without the consent and approval of the other party to the compact.

Editor's Note. On Sept. 1 the Committee passed a resolution (A/AC.35/L.148) noting that the information before it indicates that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico may be considered as falling outside the scope of article 73 (e) of the charter. The resolution will be included in the Committee's report which the General Assembly will consider at its eighth session.

With that short background statement I would like to turn to my distinguished friend, Dr. Fernos.

Dr. Fernos, although still in the prime of his life, is one of the grand old men of Puerto Rico. For many years he has represented the Puerto Rican people in Congress. He was one of the principal architects of the new constitution and, as you have already heard, he served as President of the Constitutional Convention. When the history is written about this period in the life of Puerto Rico, his name will bulk very large.

It therefore gives me great pleasure to introduce to you Dr. Fernos, resident commissioner for Puerto Rico in the United States House of Representatives and Alternate United States Representative in this Committee.

STATEMENT BY DR. FERNOS-ISERN

The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the terms of the compact governing its political and economic relations, solemnly entered into by the people of Puerto Rico and the United States of America, are the product of the free determination of the Puerto Rican people.

Before proceeding may I state that, with respect to the people of Puerto Rico, I hold the office of Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico and as such am recognized by the several departments, including the legislative department, of the Government of the United States. This is an elective office. Elections in Puerto Rico are based on universal suffrage, any male or female over 21 being able to vote without any property or literacy requirements. I have held the office of Resident Commissioner since 1946—at first by appointment; by election since 1948. In 1952 I was re-elected by approximately 65 percent of the total vote cast and by a margin of about 305,000 votes over the number received by my nearest opponent, who obtained 19 percent of the votes cast for Resident Commissioner. During the whole process of establishing the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, I have had the solemn obligation to represent the will of the Puerto Rican people, both as regards the political status which they have chosen for themselves and as regards the other aspects of their democratic will.

Before this Committee of the United Nations I have the honor to represent the Government of the United States. It is obvious that I could not have accepted this honor if the position of the United States with respect to the political status which Puerto Rico has attained were not the same as that which the Puerto Rican people have enjoined me to uphold. Possibly this is the symbol which, humble though I be, indicates most clearly the profoundly democratic reality of the relation be-

tween the United States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

An island of 3,500 square miles and 2,200,000 inhabitants, Puerto Rico became a part of Western civilization in 1508, 15 years after the discovery of the island by Christopher Columbus. From the island of Hispaniola, first site of Spanish colonization in America, Juan Ponce de Leon with other settlers went over to the island now known as Puerto Rico. From that time on Puerto Rico developed within the pattern of the Spanish colonization of the new world.

Puerto Rico continued to be united to Spain until 1898. Under the Treaty of Paris of 1899 the Spanish Crown ceded its sovereignty over Puerto Rico to the United States. Then began a new chapter in the history of the Puerto Rican people.

After a brief period of military government, the Congress of the United States enacted in 1900 a provisional charter of government for Puerto Rico, which included a series of provisions under which the political and economic relations of Puerto Rico with the United States were determined. That is to say, a government was established to deal with the internal affairs, while at the same time the Government of the United States, acting through its agencies, functioned in Puerto Rico in a manner analogous to that in which it functioned in several States of the Union in accordance with the federal system of government.

The Congress of the United States established the structure of local government and the political, economic, and fiscal relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States, which in general terms may be described as follows: The executive power was vested in a governor appointed by the President of the United States. The heads of the executive departments of the insular government were also appointed by the President. Local powers of legislation were vested in a legislative assembly composed of two houses: an Executive Council appointed by the President and a House of Delegates elected by the people. The justices of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico were appointed by the President with the consent of the United States Senate, while judges of the lower courts were either appointed by the Governor or elected by the people.

The organic act also provided for the election of a Resident Commissioner to the United States to be recognized by all the departments of the Federal Government. Subsequently the House of Representatives accorded to the Resident Commissioner all the privileges of membership in that body except the right to vote. This arrangement has continued until the present time. The inhabitants of the island were declared citizens of Puerto Rico with the right of protection by the United States. Free trade as well as a common monetary system were established, and federal

laws were declared applicable to Puerto Rico as in the United States, except tax laws.

By virtue of a series of congressional enactments, Puerto Rico enjoyed a progressive development toward self-government. By 1948 its legislative and executive branches were wholly in the hands of officials elected by the people of Puerto Rico. The President of the United States retained the power to appoint the justices of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico and the auditor. By virtue of a congressional enactment, Puerto Ricans had been citizens of the United States since 1917.

Meanwhile, during this progressive development of the Puerto Rican political system, a long debate had been taking place concerning various formulas of political status. The following concepts were debated: constitutional integration into the federal system of the United States as a State of the Union, independence, and other forms of self-government. It was evident in the debate that the Puerto Rican people desired a form of full self-government in accord with its social, historical, economic, and cultural circumstances.

The Popular Democratic Party

In 1940 a new political organization, the Popular Democratic Party, won the elections and has since gained an increasing popular support. At the beginning this party took the position that for the time being the debate over political status should be set aside and that the energies of the people should be directed to the solution of pressing economic and social problems. This is not to say that the people of Puerto Rico abandoned their fundamental political aspirations or that the new party urged that they be forsaken. From 1940 to 1944 the Popular Democratic Party laid the basis for a positive economic and social development of Puerto Rico. In 1944 this party reopened the question of Puerto Rico's political status. Consideration was given to the proposal of consulting the people in a plebiscite in which several alternatives would be offered so that the people could indicate their own choice in the matter. The fact that a popular consultation of this nature was considered as a way of resolving the political problem seemed to be an indication that public opinion was beginning to take shape but had not yet crystallized. By 1948, however, the three basic alternatives were presented to the electorate at the polls, each being advocated by a different political party. Thus in the 1948 elections the Puerto Rican people had a clear opportunity to express their views on the question of political status.

It was at that time that the Popular Democratic Party adopted the program which led to the present political status of Puerto Rico. It advocated the establishment of a commonwealth linked to the United States by political and economic ties

which the party considered essential to the economic welfare and security of Puerto Rico. A coalition of parties committed to the principle of full assimilation favored the admission of Puerto Rico into the Federal Union as a state. The Independence Party, just recently organized, proposed complete separation from the United States and the establishment of an independent republic. With this background the general elections of 1948 were held. The results showed an unequivocal expression of the people's will. The Popular Democratic Party obtained 392,386 votes; the Coalition obtained 182,977 votes; and the Independence Party received 65,351 votes.

The people of Puerto Rico have held fast to the course which they then set for themselves. They have emphatically reaffirmed their decision in a series of referenda held during the period when the new constitution was in the process of drafting and adoption, as well as in the general election held in November 1952 after the establishment of the Commonwealth. In the latter election, the Popular Democratic Party obtained 431,409 votes and the Independence Party 126,228 votes; while the Statehood and Socialist Parties, formerly members of the Coalition, received 85,591 and 21,719 votes, respectively, or a total of 107,310 votes.

On March 13, 1950, in accordance with the results of the 1948 election, the Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico introduced a bill in the United States House of Representatives initiating the process which led to the establishment of the Commonwealth. A few months later Congress adopted the measure (Public Law 600 of the 81st Cong.) in the nature of a compact which had to be submitted to the people of Puerto Rico for their approval or rejection.

Then began in Puerto Rico a serious political debate in which all points of view were freely expressed through all the media which a free and democratic society can provide. It was a debate in which all political parties, the advocates of the compact as well as the opponents, took an active part. The result of the referendum was the following: in favor of the compact, 387,016 votes; opposed, 119,169.

In accordance with the procedure prescribed by the terms of the compact, delegates to the constitutional convention of Puerto Rico were then elected. The convention was composed of 92 members. Three of the four political parties of the island were represented in it, the missing one being the Independence Party, which had taken part in the public debate prior to the referendum but had refrained from nominating candidates in the election of delegates to the convention. After deliberations lasting 4 months, the convention adopted a constitution for Puerto Rico by a vote of 88 to 3, one member being absent. Again in accordance with the terms of the compact, the constitution adopted by the convention was sub-

mitted to the people in a referendum, and it was ratified by a vote of 373,594 in favor and 82,877 opposed.

The Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico consequently introduced in the House of Representatives Joint Resolution 430, which was approved by the Congress and signed by the President of the United States on July 3, 1952.¹ In this Joint Resolution (Public Law 447 of the 82d Cong.) it is declared by the Congress that the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico fully satisfied the terms of the compact.

Both the Congress of the United States and the people of Puerto Rico having approved the compact and the Constitution of the Commonwealth, the Governor of Puerto Rico, on July 25, 1952, proclaimed the constitution to be in effect.

The preamble of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico begins with the following words:

We, the people of Puerto Rico, in order to organize ourselves politically on a fully democratic basis, to promote the general welfare, and to secure for ourselves and our posterity the complete enjoyment of human rights, placing our trust in Almighty God, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the Commonwealth which, in the exercise of our natural rights, we now create within our union with the United States of America.

It should be pointed out that the Constitution of Puerto Rico was adopted in both Spanish and English. In the English version the word "Commonwealth" was used, while in Spanish the expression "Estado Libre Asociado" was employed.

Resolution 22, approved in the plenary session of the constitutional convention held on February 4, 1952, reads as follows:

"The word commonwealth in contemporary English usage means a politically organized community, that is to say, a state (using the word in the generic sense) in which political power resides ultimately in the people, hence a free state, but one which is at the same time linked to a broader political system in a federal or other type of association and therefore does not have an independent and separate existence." And further, "the single word commonwealth, as currently used, clearly defines the status of the body politic created under the terms of the compact existing between the people of Puerto Rico and the United States, i. e., that of a state which is free of superior authority in the management of its own local affairs but which is linked to the United States of America and hence is a part of its political system in a manner compatible with its federal structure."

The constitution in its first article proclaims the creation of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico whose "political power emanates from the people." This political power is to be exercised in accordance with the will of the people "within the terms of the compact of Puerto Rico and the United States of America." The constitution also declares that the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico shall be republican in form and

that its legislative, judicial, and executive branches are subordinate to the sovereignty of the people of Puerto Rico. It adds that the political authority of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico extends to the island of Puerto Rico and to the adjacent islands within its jurisdiction. The constitution contains a bill of rights,² provisions of a general character and still others of a transitory character, and it provides for its own amendment, a process in which the decision of the people, consulted in a referendum, is final.

Relations With United States

Until July 25, 1952, the government of the island, in spite of the large degree of self-government which Puerto Rico already enjoyed, had been based on a charter granted by the Congress of the United States. The structure of the basic governmental institutions of Puerto Rico, even though following an undeniably republican pattern, derived from an organic law enacted by the Congress. The people of Puerto Rico already elected a chief executive and the entire legislative body. The justices of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico as well as the auditor were, however, appointed by the President of the United States.

Under the organic act the Congress had reserved to itself the power to annul laws adopted by the Puerto Rican legislature. In case a law was vetoed by the Governor, its readoption by a two-thirds vote of the legislature did not override the veto. The final decision remained with the President of the United States.

This political situation changed fundamentally with the achievement of full self-government by the people of Puerto Rico under their own constitution and within the compact agreed upon. The basis for the political relationship theretofore existing between both peoples was changed to that of voluntary association under the compact, and any semblance of a colonial relationship was eliminated.

As of July 25, 1952, the jurisdiction of the Federal Government in Puerto Rico is based on a bilateral compact to which it is a party and into which the people of Puerto Rico have entered of their own volition. The Puerto Rican state of today has been created by the will of the people, in the exercise of their natural rights. The limitations to the sovereignty of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico are those agreed to by its people. In consequence, Puerto Rico is today in the most profoundly democratic sense of the word a free people voluntarily associated with the United States of America.

It is worth noting in this connection that the system of economic relations which Congress es-

¹ For President Truman's statement on signing the resolution, see BULLETIN of July 21, 1952, p. 91.

² For a summary of the human rights provisions, see *ibid.*, Nov. 10, 1952, p. 758.

established in 1900 between the United States and Puerto Rico has assured tariff-free trade between both areas, thus giving the products of Puerto Rico free access to the U. S. market. This system of free trade is essential to the economic life of Puerto Rico and has remained in effect under the terms of the compact. Similarly, it should be pointed out that the people of Puerto Rico who are today citizens of the Commonwealth continue to be citizens of the United States of America, with free access to the entire country and with the right to complete freedom of movement therein. The importance of this provision can be judged by the number of Puerto Ricans now residing in the United States. These Puerto Ricans, as well as all those who will reside here in the future, become automatically incorporated into the political life of the country and have the right to vote in state and national elections simply by virtue of their residence and as a prerogative of their citizenship.

A study of the political development of Puerto Rico makes clear the fact that the Puerto Rican people have worked out a free, democratic, and fully self-governing way of life and that they have taken care to give it a form harmonious with their basic problems; that is to say, in accord with their geographic, demographic, economic, and cultural circumstances.

Puerto Rico has not detached itself from the United States to form an independent state, nor has it become integrated into the Federal Union, which would mean constitutional assimilation and would entail also its cultural assimilation. In establishing their Commonwealth, the people of Puerto Rico have created it within a framework of relations with the United States which in large measure parallel those of the federal system and are yet especially adapted to Puerto Rican circumstances. In scope of sovereignty Puerto Rico may be compared to the States in the Union, though it should be pointed out that, unlike the States, Puerto Rico enjoys complete fiscal autonomy. In Puerto Rico only the Commonwealth government has the power to tax its citizens. In the continental United States, on the other hand, the taxing power within each State is shared by the Federal and State Government. Thus, the citizens of Puerto Rico are not subject to fiscal obligations other than those which their own elected representatives in their own legislative body impose upon them, and in consequence this legislative body is the one which has exclusive power to set final policy and to direct governmental action toward the economic and social development of Puerto Rico.

In reaching the Commonwealth status, the people of Puerto Rico have full jurisdiction over all phases of their internal commerce, a power formerly subject to the limits which might be placed upon it by acts of the Congress of the United States. In this sense Puerto Rico is in a situation

analogous to that of a State of the Union, for by the terms of the compact the acts of Congress in effect in Puerto Rico (save internal revenue laws) are applied as elsewhere in the United States and within the same limitations. On the other hand, none of the members of any of the three branches of the Government of the Commonwealth is subject to the authority or owes his appointment to any other power than that of the people of Puerto Rico exercised under the provisions of the Commonwealth Constitution and in conformity with the laws which the people of Puerto Rico have given themselves.

The Judicial System

The Governor, elected by the people, appoints the members of his Cabinet with the advice and consent of the Senate of the Commonwealth. The auditor, previously appointed by the President, has been replaced by a controller named by the Governor with the advice and consent of both houses and responsible only to the legislative branch. The structure of the Puerto Rican judiciary is determined by the Commonwealth Constitution. The justices of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico as well as the judges of the lower courts receive their appointments from the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate of Puerto Rico. Under the terms of the compact the judicial system of the Commonwealth is integrated into the federal judicial system on conditions analogous to those which integrate into the federal judiciary the judicial systems of the States of the Union. Equally with their fellow-citizens of the States, the citizens of Puerto Rico can appeal in the last instance to the Supreme Court of the United States. Equally with the supreme tribunals of the federated States, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico is the arbiter concerning the meaning of the constitution and laws of Puerto Rico. The integration into the federal judiciary serves the primary purpose, indispensable in any federal system, of interpreting the applicable provisions of federal laws and of the federal Constitution.

Under the Constitution of the Commonwealth, the Legislative Assembly may be authorized to provide for the flag, the coat of arms, and the anthem of the Commonwealth. By legislative action, the lone star flag, with the blue triangle and the red and white stripes, the old coat of arms granted by the Catholic kings and "La Borinquena," are today the flag, the coat of arms, and the anthem of the Commonwealth.

The Puerto Rican community has attained full self-government, as much in political affairs as in economic, social, and cultural. The people of Puerto Rico hold in their own hands the destiny of their internal government. In Puerto Rico there are no minority groups who have reached a

position of economic privilege by virtue of external authority. The Puerto Rican people have won their own freedom without external restrictions of any kind.

Puerto Rico has a long and stable democratic tradition. The provisions of its electoral law, in addition to the profound democratic sense of the people, assure the fullest expression of the will of the people through secret and universal suffrage. The electoral law adopted many years ago, and by a Legislative Assembly with a political composition quite different from the present one, by established tradition is not amended unless it be approved by all registered political parties. An extraordinarily high proportion of the people participate in elections. The strikingly democratic character of the electoral process is one of the traditions of which the Puerto Rican people are most proud.

Public Opinion

They are equally proud of their determination to keep open the channels of the free expression of public opinion. The organization of political parties in Puerto Rico is protected by law. Without going back any further, in the year 1947 when it was evident that public opinion in Puerto Rico was crystallizing into three groups, one of which, that of the advocates of independence, was not then established as a political party, the legislature (in which were represented all the other parties) reduced the legal requirements for the registration of new parties. The number of signatures required by law for petitions was at that time not less than 10 percent of the number of voters who participated in the last previous election. This figure was reduced to 5 percent in the year 1947, thus facilitating the organization of the Independence Party.

Similarly, the Puerto Rican people are concerned that all groups of organized opinion obtain adequate representation in the legislature. By contrast with the provisions in effect prior to the adoption of the constitution, article III provides for the seating of additional legislators from the minority parties, over and above those regularly elected, in order to make their strength in each house roughly proportionate to the strength shown by the total votes cast for their respective parties. Before the adoption of the Commonwealth Constitution, the minority parties had only 2 seats out of 19 in the Senate and only 1 seat out of 39 in the House, whereas in the first election after the approval of the constitution the number of minority senators was 9 out of 32, and the number of minority members in the House of Representatives was 17 out of 64. It should be noted that the number of votes cast for the majority party in 1948 was 392,386 and in 1952, 431,409, whereas the total number of votes received by the

minority parties was 248,328 in 1948 and 233,528 in 1952. Thus, though the minority vote has decreased, the minority representation in the Legislative Assembly has substantially increased.

The program of economic, social, and cultural development which has been carried out in Puerto Rico since even before the establishment of the Commonwealth has been conceived in the spirit of freedom. Puerto Rico is trying to be realistic in its use of the great energies of private enterprise in those aspects of its economic development in which such energies are usable and is also taking advantage of democratic planning where the public interest calls for governmental initiative. The agrarian reform undertaken to recover the land from great concentrations of ownership in order to put it in the hands of the small farmer, the program for the diversification of agriculture, the development of electric power, the low-cost housing program—all these are eloquent proof of the efforts Puerto Rico has been making in its quest for a better and free life.

The intensity of its efforts to improve economic standards and to enrich human values is well known throughout the world. As was mentioned earlier in this Committee during the discussion on education, and with reference to technical assistance to underdeveloped countries, Puerto Rico on her own initiative has become a center for such activities for more than 700 scholarship students from Latin America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and New Zealand—i. e., from all the continents of the world. With their own eyes they have been able to see the imagination and energy with which the Puerto Rican people have confronted their very grave problems and how this effort has been developed in a thoroughly democratic manner. It goes without saying that a country in which the spirit of liberty is not respected could not very well have provided adequate ground for such a program of technical assistance.

The clean democratic life of the people of Puerto Rico has so strengthened their faith in liberty that they have been and always will be ready to defend it with their lives whenever it has been or may be in danger of perishing. Whenever such danger has faced the free world, the Puerto Ricans have always taken up their posts of duty and honor in response to the demands democracy has made upon them.

In 1917, when the free world had to face aggression in the First World War, the people of Puerto Rico, through the voice of their representatives in the Legislative Assembly, placed themselves on the side of the free peoples of the world and got ready to defend with their lives that which was the essence of their own existence and that of the other free peoples. When the Second World War broke out, more than 59,000 Puerto Ricans were called to military service. In the face of the danger that the free world might lose its democratic way of life, more than 70,000 Puerto

Ricans volunteered to serve under the standards of democracy.

On a third occasion, the outbreak of the conflict in Korea, the Puerto Ricans showed the same readiness to fight in defense of the free world and of the principles of the United Nations. Out of the 43,434 Puerto Ricans who entered the armed forces of the United States from September 1950 to July 31, 1953, more than 23,000 were volunteers. In conclusion, it is important to point out that the political formula and procedures which have culminated in the changed relations between Puerto Rico and the United States and in the adoption of the bilateral compact and the Commonwealth Constitution were initiated by the people of Puerto Rico themselves, participating in the whole process always on the basis of the free decisions of the Puerto Rican electorate.

Upon the proclamation of the Commonwealth Constitution, within the terms of the political relations with the United States as established by the compact, Puerto Rico has declared that it considers that its basic political problem is solved, inasmuch as it has achieved sovereignty through a political and economic relationship essential to its development and even to its very existence. It was undoubtedly in terms of this criterion that the constitutional convention in its resolution 23 declared:

Whereas, the Constitutional Convention of Puerto Rico, in fulfilling the important mission assigned it by the people, has approved a Constitution for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico within the terms of the compact entered into with the United States of America;

(d) Thus we attain the goal of complete self-government, the last vestiges of colonialism having disappeared in the principle of Compact, and we enter into an era of new developments in democratic civilization. Nothing can surpass in political dignity the principle of mutual consent and of compacts freely agreed upon. The spirit of the people of Puerto Rico is free for great undertakings now and in the future. Having full political dignity the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico may develop in other ways by modifications of the Compact through mutual consent.

(e) The people of Puerto Rico reserve the right to propose and to accept modifications in the terms of its relations with the United States of America, in order that these relations may at all times be the expression of an agreement freely entered into between the people of Puerto Rico and the United States of America.

Furthermore, the President of the United States, in a letter addressed to the Governor of Puerto Rico on the occasion of the first anniversary of the establishment of the Commonwealth, July 25 of this year, said the following:

DEAR GOVERNOR MUÑOZ: I am happy to extend to the people of Puerto Rico my heartfelt congratulations upon

their celebration of the first anniversary of their Commonwealth. This memorable day also marks the fifty-fifth anniversary of the close association and friendship that have existed between the people of Puerto Rico and their fellow citizens of this Union of States.

Our bond of common citizenship means common freedom—the freedom of the sovereign will of the people to rule the people's destiny. Today, when the evil forces of tyranny are so tirelessly at work, we are more than ever united in our resolve to preserve this common treasure.

We know that our voluntary association—first proposed by the people of Puerto Rico themselves and then enacted into law by the Congress—is eloquent testimony to a half century of ever growing mutual respect and understanding. I have learned with profound interest of many of the achievements of the people of Puerto Rico under the free institutions they have created in their own Commonwealth. I share with them their deep pride in these accomplishments.

The union which we share will endure because it is founded on freedom. Time may bring changes in its outward forms and expressions, but they shall ever be expressions of the mutual trust and the mutual friendship binding us today and always.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

May I end this statement, Mr. Chairman, with the following remark: Although the people of Puerto Rico realize that the Commonwealth is a political status in itself, subject to growth within itself, the people of Puerto Rico also understand that there is nothing in such status which precludes its ever being changed in the same way that it was created, by common consent and with due regard to the principle of self-determination. The law which establishes the compact fully recognizes the "principle of government by consent." The tradition in the United States, according to the Philippines the status which the majority of their people requested, does not leave room for reasonable doubt concerning what the attitude of the United States would be toward a similar petition advanced by a Puerto Rican majority. I can say this with complete confidence, as a representative here of the United States. With equal confidence I can say it anywhere as an elected representative of the people of Puerto Rico.

Appointments to Caribbean Commission

White House office press release

The President on September 4 appointed the following to be Commissioners of the U.S. Section of the Caribbean Commission for terms of 1 year:

Jorge Luis Cordova Diaz of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

Roberto Francisco of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

Bindley C. Cyrus of Chicago, Ill.

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†498	9/12	Hoover: appointment

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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